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LEGAL STANDARDS AND STATISTICAL PROOF IN TITLE VII
LITIGATION: IN SEARCH OF A COHERENT DISPARATE
IMPACT MODEL
MARCEL C. GARAUDt
For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of
the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the
master of economics.
1
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 makes it unlawful for
an employer to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.3 The interpretation of the statute by the
Supreme Court has led to the development of two distinct types of
hiring discrimination claims: disparate treatment and disparate
impact. The disparate impact claim evolved out of the need to
eradicate the less obvious forms of discrimination, perpetrated by
"employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group
than another and cannot be justified by business necessity."5 In
t B.A., B.S. 1986, J.D. Candidate 1991, University of Pennsylvania. The author
wishes to thank Professor Susan Sturm for her helpful comments and suggestions,
and professor David Kaye for his review of a previous version of this Comment. The
encouragement of Sam Hollander was also appreciated.
I O.W. HoLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187 (1920).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
3 See id. The statute provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ.
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
4 See infra note 16.
5 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 355 n.15 (1977).
(455)
456 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 139: 455
disparate impact cases, the plaintiff must focus her efforts on
showing the discriminatory impact of a hiring procedure. Once the
plaintiff has made a prima facie case, 6 the burden of proof shifts to
the defendant to show that the hiring procedure is justified by
business necessity. 7 Through the years, statistical analysis has been
the method of choice to show disparate impact, mainly because it
is the only proof available in many cases of employment discrimi-
nation, but also because it makes "[ilnequality between blacks and
whites, men and women, young and old.., stand out like figures
carved in a mountainside."
8
Yet the increased use of statistical methods in the disparate
impact courtroom has forced the Title VII judge to become an
expert in statistical analysis. Judges have struggled to adapt to this
quantitative framework, but the development of disparate impact
doctrine indicates that their attempts have not been very successful.
They have misunderstood basic statistical principles and misinter-
preted the relationship between statistical conclusions and legal
constructs such as the prima facie case and the burden of proof.
The cost of this confusion has been borne by the disparate
impact plaintiff, who has had to present statistical analyses that
satisfy a strict scientific standard that is inconsistent with the
traditional legal standards of proof. The existence of this scientific
standard is evident in the long line of cases originating with Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 9 the Supreme Court case that defined the
disparate impact framework. The recent Supreme Court case of
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio1 ° has added fuel to the fire by
requiring that the plaintiff present an air-tight statistical case, thus
essentially insulating the defendant employer from disparate impact
claims.
This Comment explores the traditional and recent statistical
fallacies to which judges have adhered in their interpretations of the
statistical requirements necessary to satisfy the prima facie stage of
the disparate impact case. It also examines the possibility of
developing an improved disparate impact framework through
6 See infra notes 22-51 and accompanying text (discussing what constitutes a
disparate impact prima facie case).
7 See infra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing the business necessity
justification).
8 Delgado, On Taking Back Our Civil Rights Promises: When Equality Doesn't
Compute, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 579, 579-80.
9 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
10 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
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Bayesian probability theory, a mathematical model -that compels a
judge to give the appropriate weight to statistical evidence intro-
duced by the* disparate impact plaintiff. Part I examines the
statistical misunderstandings that arose under the traditional
disparate impact framework outlined in Griggs and its progeny. Part
II shows how the recent Supreme Court case, Wards Cove, has held
plaintiffs to a near-scientific standard of proof by devising strict
causation requirements for the plaintiff. Part III assesses the
potential for creating a more coherent disparate impact framework,
and concludes that use of the Bayesian probability model to analyze
disparate impact claims will result in both a more equitable trial for
the plaintiff and a more approachable framework for the judge.
I. THE TRADITIONAL DISPARATE IMPACT FRAMEWORK
The enactment of Title VII over twenty-five years ago marked
the firs* statutory attempt to eradicate employment discrimination.
The statute explicitly outlawed intentional discrimination, and the
Supreme Court in Griggs interpreted Title VII to extend to cases in
which the employer enforced facially neutral job requirements that
discriminated against protected classes. Subsequently, the Griggs
disparate impact framework has been modified by Wards Cove,
which stands as current law.11  The traditional framework is
reviewed first, however, in order to show how courts misinterpreted
statistical requirements at the prima facie stage. Next, the impact
of Wards Cove on the prima facie case will be analyzed to show how
the Supreme Court built on these misinterpretations to create an
even less coherent disparate impact theory.
Griggs represents the cornerstone of the disparate impact
doctrine, which "prohibits the use of selection criteria and proce-
dures which substantially burden minority group members, unless
they can be justified in a manner that would not be required in the
absence of unequal results." 12 The Griggs majority recognized that
to provide for the equal opportunity mandate of Title VII, it is
necessary to outlaw neutral employment standards and procedures
that "operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices." 13 Griggs sent to employers the message
11 See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text (discussing the possible legislative
overruling of Wards Cove).
12 D. BALDUS &J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 44 (1980).
15 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
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that all hiring practices with harmful effects on minorities must be
justified by business necessity,14 regardless of the good faith with
which they are instituted.
This new class of disparate impact employment discrimination
cases arose from the Court's statutory construction of Title VII,
15
and stood in contrast to the traditional disparate treatment cases
that had been brought under Title VII. 16  Those cases require
proof of the employer's -discriminatory intent and are therefore
usually successful in instances of identifiable prejudice. 17 The
disparate impact case provides plaintiffs with the opportunity to
present a claim of discrimination when bias is latent or nonexis-
tent.18  The plaintiffs case is met by a showing that she and
14 See infra note 69.
15 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434-:36. The disparate impact theory is applied today in
other areas. See, e.g., Voting Rights Amendments of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973b
(1982) (stating that no voting qualifications, tests, or procedures maybe imposed or
applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement or the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color); Note, Business Necessity in Title VII: Importing an Employment
Discimination Doctfine into the FairHousingAc 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 563, 564 (1986)
(analyzing the use of disparate impact analysis to prove discrimination in housing);
Note, Disparate Inpact Analysis and the Age Disc2inination in Employment Act 68 MINN.
L. REV. 1038, 1040 (1984) (examining the use of disparate impact analysis in age
discrimination cases arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); see
also Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2129 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16 The disparate treatment model is applied when the plaintiff alleges that the
employer perpetrated intentional, purposeful discrimination in applying a hiring
procedure. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335 n.15 (1977) (defining disparate treatment actions as cases in which "[t]he
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin"). Proof of discrimination in a disparate
treatment case focuses on direct evidence of the employer's discriminatory motive
and intent. Direct testimony is pivotal in establishing intent, although "[piroof of
discriminatory motive ... can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of
differences in treatment." Id. The disparate treatment case is therefore most often
used when the plaintiff may prove the employer's discriminatory intent to some
degree. See also D. BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note 12, at 44-46. Baldus and Cole state
that disparate impact differs from disparate treatment in three major ways. First, the
defendant's state of mind is irrelevant in a disparate impact case, while discriminatory
purpose is required under disparate treatment. Second, disparate impact doctrine
allows the defendant to rebut the prima facie case with a showing of business
justification, while the defendant's justification is irrelevant in disparate treatment
cases. Third, while disparate impact can be used to challenge facially neutral
selection procedures, disparate treatment can only apply to situations in which the
defendant has sufficient discretion to allow an illegitimate factor to influence her
decisions. See id.
17 See, e.g., D. BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note 12, at 26 ("The [disparate treatment]
claim alleges intentional, purposeful discrimination in either a rule-making or a rule-
applying context.").
18 Cf. id. at 46 (stating that no clear standard has yet been developed by the courts
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members of her class are in effect being "closed out" of job
opportunities by certain identifiable neutral employment practic-
es.
19
A. Statistical Analysis and the Prima Facie Case
The prerequisites for bringing a disparate impact case under
Griggs and its progeny are twofold. First, the plaintiff must satisfy
the requirements of the prima facie case, by showing that the
employer's hiring practice has a disparate impact on protected
minorities. Once the plaintiff satisfies this burden, the employer is
given the opportunity to rebut the prima facie case by showing that
the hiring practice was justified by business necessity.2 ° The
defendant employer's failure to prove business necessity results in
ajudgment for the plaintiff. Finally, if the employer establishes that
the rule or procedure is necessary, it will violate Title VII if there
exists a selection that achieves the same result but has a lesser
disparate impact on the plaintiffs class.21 The prima facie case
represents the plaintiffs "first hurdle." She must present enough
evidence to establish an inference of discrimination. The defen-
dant's opportunity to show business necessity represents the
plaintiff's "second hurdle." The plaintiff's case must be strong
enough to withstand any allegations by the defendant employer that
the practice was a business necessity. The plaintiff must surmount
both these hurdles to prevail.
In a disparate impact case, a plaintiff satisfies the prima facie
rule22 when she introduces sufficient evidence to establish a
to identify the factual situations in which a disparate impact claim will lie).
19 See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 n.6 (finding that although census data indicated
that 34% of North Carolina's white males and 12% of its black males had completed
high school, EEOC findings showed that the employer's transfer qualification tests
resulted in 58% of whites passing and only 6% of blacks).
20 See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
21 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
22 There are two interpretations of the requirements of a prima facie case. One
views the rule as being satisfied when the plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence
to send the case to the jury, while the other considers it satisfied when the plaintiff
has not only removed by sufficient evidence the duty of producing evidence
to get ... to the jury, but has gone further, and, either by means of a
presumption or by a general mass of strong evidence, has entitled himself
to a ruling that the opponent should fail if he does nothing more in the way
of producing evidence.
9J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2494, at 379 (1981). The latter rule is applied in disparate
impact cases, such that where the plaintiff establishes an inference of discrimination
1990)
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significant statistical under-representation or harmful effect on her
class. 23  If the statistical evidence satisfies the court's disparate
impact guidelines, an inference of disparate treatment will arise.
24
Because disparate impact. cases center on the harmful effects of
certain quantifiable characteristics of the employer's selection
process, proof of disparate impact will almost always be in quantita-
tive form. The reliance on quantitative evidence is so great that
"[u]nder a disparate impact theory, statistical evidence of impact is
not merely circumstantial (as it is under disparate treatment theory),
but is direct evidence of the results which trigger the demand for
additional justification." 25  Because plaintiffs develop statistical
analyses to gauge the effect of an employer's hiring procedures on
members of the plaintiff class, 26 satisfying the prima facie rule will
often hinge on the accuracy and credibility of the plaintiff's
statistical analysis. For that reason, parties in disparate impact cases
spend a considerable amount of time preparing statistical studies
that will buttress their arguments in court.
A wide variety of statistical methods are available to assist the
plaintiff in preparing the prima facie case. 2 7 Indeed, the issue of
in the prima facie case, this operates as a presumption in her favor. If the defendant
fails to satisfy her burden of rebuttal, the plaintiff will prevail. See Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,254 (1981) ("Establishment of the prima
facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated
against the employee."); Furnco C"onstr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,577 (1978) ("A
prima facie case ... raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the
consideration of impermissible factors."); see also Smalls, The Burden of Proof in Title
VII Cases, 25 How. L.J. 247, 252-53 nn.31-34 (1982) (citing cases and relevant dicta).
23 See Comment, Statistics and Title VII Proof: Prima Facie Case and Rebutta 15
Hous. L. REV. 1030, 1034 (1978).
24 See D. BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note 12, at 46. Typically, the trier of fact in a
Title VII action is the judge, so that she-not a jury-will determine whether the
plaintiff's statistics establish an inference of discrimination. This framework arose
from the broad powers Congress gave to the courts to eradicate employment
discrimination. See, e.g., Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418 ("It is... the purpose of Title VII
to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful discrimination.
This is shown by the very fact that Congress took care to arm the courts with full
equitable powers.").
25 D. BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note 12, at 47-48.
26 For example, Baldus and Cole state that the plaintiff's evidence may provide
evidence of how the system actually operates (e.g., comparative black and
white pass rates for actual applicants) or ... evidence of how it would
operate if applied to a population of potential applicants (e.g., since fewer
blacks than whites have a high school diploma, the eligibility requirement
of a high school diploma has an adverse impact on blacks).
Id. at 47.
27 For a primer on statistical methods, see generally W. CURTIS, STATISTICAL
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selecting and correctly applying the proper statistical method in a
disparate impact case has received a considerable amount of
attention from scholars. 28  The variety of statistical methods
permits the plaintiff to tailor her statistical study to her legal
argument. 29 The plaintiff's choice of a statistical method is thus a
crucial one since the inference of discrimination arises only if the
plaintiff has constructed a coherent analysis.
A preferred method of statistical analysis is hypothesis testing,
a statistical procedure used to settle "disputed questions on which
statistical evidence is brought to bear."30 The hypothesis being
tested is termed the null hypothesis, or "the characteristic ...
postulated or hypothesized to exist in a universe . . ."31 In the
context of employment discrimination litigation, the null hypothesis
is that "race or gender is not involved in the employer's employment
decisions." 32 The statistical test of this hypothesis will eventually
lead to its acceptance or rejection.
The test is conducted by compiling a sample or set of observa-
tions-that consist namely of employment decisions-and using that
CONCEPTS FOR ATTORNEYS: A REFERENCE GUIDE (1983).
28 See, e.g., Aickin, Issues and Methods in Employment Discri7nination Statistics, 26
JURIMETRICSJ. 347, 352-55 (1986) (reyiewing the use of social sciences hypothesis
testing methodology in the legal system); Curtis & Wilson, The Use of Statistics and
Statisticians in the Litigation Process, 20 JURIMETRICS J. 109, 111-15 (1979) (listing
examples of the use of statistical concepts in court); Follett & Welch, Testing for
Discrimination in Employment Practices, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 171 (1983)
(illustrating "the use of statistics to test for discrimination in employment practices");
Otto, Discrimination in Hiring-Makinga Statistical Case, 11 T. MARSHALL LJ. 85, 89-90
(1985) (reviewing the forms of statistical modeling available to employment
discrimination plaintiffs); Smith & Abram, Quantitative Analysis and Proof of
Employment Discrimination, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 33, 35 (discussing "the treatment by
lower courts of quantitative analyses and statistical inferences in employment
discrimination cases"); Note, Title VII, Multiple Linear Regression Models, and the Courts:
An Analysis, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 283, 284 (1983) (examining the use of
multiple regression models in courts). See generally M. ZIMMER, C. SULUVAN & R.
RICHARDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 117-34, 247-54
(2d ed. 1988) (discussing sophisticated technical methods to analyze particular
employer selection devices).
29 See, e.g., Smith & Abram, supra note 28, at 40 n.28 ("The use of the 'binomial
test' ... is appropriate where, for example, the minority t o nonminority ratio of
employees is compared with the same ratio in the population .... To evaluate the
statistical significance of differences in hire rates for minorities and nonminorities,
a different test... may be used.").
-o Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1333
(1986).
s1 D. BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note 12, at 355.
32 See M. ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN & R. RICHARDS, supra note 28, at 119.
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data to confirm or reject the null hypothesis. The probative value
of the hypothesis test will increase with sample size. From a
disparate impact standpoint, this means that the smaller the number
of observations, the more likely that a conclusion of discrimination
is tenuous. 3  For the test of statistical inference to be valid, the
sample also must be a random selection from a relevant class of
data. 4 Although data selection is, in a sense, a preliminary step
to conducting the statistical analysis, it is a crucial one. Indeed, the
validity of the analysis will hinge on the requirements of random-
ness and relevance of the data that was selected. If the sample size
is small in relation to the total number of observations, due to
limited data, for instance, the defendant may challenge the
plaintiffs data selection as flawed. She will argue that the data does
not represent a valid cross-section of employment decisions in the
workplace, so that any statistical conclusions drawn from the data
are biased. The plaintiff must, therefore, be ready to defend her
methods of data selection in court.
Once the null hypothesis and the sample have been selected, a
level of statistical significance must be chosen. Statistical signifi-
cance measures the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when
it is in fact true.3 5 The choice of a significance level is a matter of
judgment and depends on the ultimate purpose of the statistical
test.36  If, for example, the disparate impact plaintiff selects a
significance level of 5%, the null hypothesis of no discrimination
will not be rejected unless the probability that the results occurred
by chance is less than 5%.
The complement of the significance level is the "confidence
coefficient," equal to one minus the significance level. The
confidence coefficient in the above example would, for instance, be
33 See D. BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note 12, at 32, 134-36; M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTI-
TATIVE METHODS IN LAW 5 (1978). From a practical standpoint, if the defendant in
a disparate impact case has a small number of employees, it will be more likely that
the plaintiff's analysis encompasses the entire sample of relevant observations. If,
however, the employer is a corporation with thousands of employees, the sample size
will probably be smaller than the total number of relevant observations, since the
plaintiff will often be unable to compile the multitude of relevant employment
decisions.
34 See D. BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note 12, at 313.
35 See Dawson, Are Statisticians Being Fair to Employment Discimination Plaintiffs?,
21 JURIMETRIcs J. 1, 1 (1980); Kaye, The Numbers Game: Statistical Inference in
Discrimination Cases, 80 MICH. L,. REV. 833, 844 n.41 (1982).
36 See W. CURTIS, supra note 27, at 119-20.
37 See Kaye, supra note 30, at 1347.
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95%. It must be stressed that the confidence coefficient does not
necessarily represent the probability that the findings of the analysis
are correct. The reason for this is that the statistical test generating
the confidence coefficient does not incorporate all the probabilities
that are required to make this a valid statement. Although the
statistical reasoning behind this assertion is not entirely intuitive, it
may be summarized as follows: the hypothesis test that generates
the confidence coefficient calculates the probability of the observed
evidence given the null hypothesis of no discrimination. In
probabilistic terms, however, the burden of persuasion relates to the
probability that the disparity is associated with discrimination given
the statistical and non-statistical evidence.3 8 These two probabili-
ties are not the same, so that probabilities generated through
hypothesis testing may not be viewed as indicators of certainty, and
thus do not gauge the degree to which legal standards of proof have
been satisfied. For the hypothesis test to model accurately the
burden of persuasion, it must also look to "the probability of the
evidence given the alternative hypothesis and the probability of the
hypothesis itself."
39
38 Thus, this probability must exceed the value attributed to the burden of
persuasion for the burden to be satisfied. For a discussion of the probabilistic
interpretation of the burden of persuasion, see infra notes 156-62 and accompanying
text.
39 Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of Persuasion, 46 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 13, 22-23 (1983). Kaye has constructed a good example that illustrates the
above reasoning. Assume that a gambler represents that certain dice have a 50%
chance of showing an even or odd number, although in fact, the gambler also carries
a second pair of loaded dice that have an 80% probability of showing an odd number.
Assume that the gambler entices an unsuspecting stranger into playing a game in
which they alternate rolling the dice and predicting whether the outcome will be even
or odd. They play ten times, and the dice come out odd eight of those times. The
innocent bystander loses a large sum of money, and later discovering that the gambler
always carries two sets of dice with her, brings suit against the gambler. How does
the jury decide whether the dice were loaded? If a hypothesis test is used, the null
hypothesis is that the defendant used the fair dice, while the alternative hypothesis
is that she used the loaded dice. The test generates the probability of the evidence
(eight odd outcomes, two even) given the null hypothesis that the fair dice were used,
and determines that it is 5.5%. As 5.5% is deemed the level of significance, the
confidence coefficient is equal to 94.5%.
Kaye argues that the analysis does not indicate that there is a 94.5% chance that
the loaded dice were used. First, the test ignores the probability of coming up with
eight odd outcomes if the alternative dice are used. Second, the probabilities
generated by the test do not change if instead of being a "crooked gambler," the
defendant is an "honest law professor" who, not knowing that one of the two sets of
dice were loaded, selected one of the sets at random. This second point may be
expressed in probabilistic terms. The hypothesis test assumes that the null
1990]
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The third statistical concept crucial to any disparate impact
analysis is that of statistical power. Statistical power is the probabili-
ty that the statistical test will correctly reject the null hypothesis.
40
"It is the complement of the probability that the test will accept the
null hypothesis when that hypothesis is false." 41 If the power of
the test is high-and, thus, its complement low-the test will be
considerably more accurate. If, however, the power of the test is
low, its complement will be high, so that the test will be less reliable.
The concepts of statistical significance and power may also be
defined in terms of what is known as Type I and Type II errors.
Type II error is the risk that the hypothesis test fails to reject the
null hypothesis when it is false.4 2 In the employment discrimina-
tion context, this corresponds to false exculpation, that is conclud-
ing falsely that there is no discrimination where discrimination
exists. Type I error represents the risk of rejecting the null
hypothesis when it is true. This corresponds to false inculpation,
namely finding incorrectly that there has been discrimination where
no discrimination has occurred. Type I risk is another way of
expressing the concept of statistical significance, so that the
probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis increases with the
level of significance. 43 Power, on the other hand, "is the probabili-
ty of not making a Type II error," as it "is the probability of
correctly rejecting the null hypothesis." 44 Finally, although Type
I and Type II risks are not complementary in the sense that they do
not add up to one, they are inversely related-increasing one
decreases the other.
45
hypothesis-that the fair dice were used-and the alternative hypothesis-that the
loaded dice were used-are equally likely at the outset. This assumption, however, is
accurate only if, as in the case of the honest law professor, the dice are selected
randomly. Thus, the results of the hypothesis test will be inaccurate if the defendant
is a confirmed crooked gambler, as the prior probability that she will use the fair dice
will be less than 50%. One problem with hypothesis testing, then, is that it ignores
prior probabilities. See id. at 17-23. Kaye's analysis underscores one of the difficulties
of using hypothesis testing in the litigation process.
40 See Kaye, supra note 35, at 844 n.41.
41 Id.
42 See id.
43 See Feinberg, Teaching the Type I and Type 11 Errors: The Judicial Process, AM.
STATISTICIAN,June 1971, at 31; Goldstein, Two Types of Statistical Errors in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 26 JUIMmETRICSJ. 32, 38 (1985).
44 See Goldstein, supra note 43, at 34.
45 See Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of linpeifect
Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 385, 411 (1985).
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The way in which Type I and Type II errors operate in the
courtroom may be described in terms of whether a defendant is
found guilty or innocent. If the defendant is found guilty of
discrimination and the null hypothesis is thus rejected, a Type II
error is impossible, since the probability of falsely failing to reject
the null hypothesis is 0.46 If, on the other hand, the defendant is
found not guilty and the hypothesis is accepted, then the probability
of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis is equal to'O, so that Type I
error is impossible. Typically, the defendant will want to point out
the degree of Type I error made by the plaintiff, while the plaintiff
will focus on the degree of Type II error made by the defendant.
47
The next step in hypothesis testing involves selection of a test
statistic with which to test the hypothesis., The plaintiff chooses a
test statistic from a number of available test statistics48 depending
on the probabilistic process that generated the data. The test
statistic is computed and compared to a chart listing the significance
levels that correspond to various values of the test statistic. From
this chart, the P value is determined, which indicates the "level of
statistical significance to be ascribed to a statistical result."
49
Typically, the P value decreases as the population analyzed increases
and as the population/workforce disparity increases.
50
Finally, by comparing the P value to the cut-off level selected
earlier in the analysis, the decision to accept or reject the null
hypothesis is made. If the significance level generated by the
analysis is lower than that required to reject the null hypothesis, the
null hypothesis is rejected and, in a disparate impact case, the
analysis will lead to a finding of discrimination. Otherwise, the null
hypothesis of no discrimination will be accepted. Ultimately, the
46 Remember that the null hypothesis is that the employer is not guilty of
discrimination, see supra text accompanying note 32, so that in this case the null
hypothesis is rejected, see Goldstein, supra note 43, at 33-34.
17 See Goldstein, supra note 43, at 34-35.
48 There are four main categories of test statistics: the Z statistic, chi-square
statistic, t statistic, and F statistic. See D. BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note 12, at 360.
49 Id. at 356.
50 The magnitude of the disparity measured in percentage differences may be
distinguished from the probability that the disparity could have occurred by chance.
These concepts are nonetheless related in the sense that "the larger the difference,
the lower the probability that [the difference] occurred by chance. .. ." Castaneda
v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 n.13 (1977) ("If a disparity is sufficiently large, then it
is unlikely that it is due solely to chance or accident, and, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, one must conclude that racial ... factorsentered into the selection
process"); Boardman & Vining, The Role of Probative Statistics in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 204-05 (1983).
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lower the significance level and thus the greater the confidence
coefficient of the analysis, the more credence a court will lend to
the hypothesis test.
5 1
B. Legal Standards and Statistical Proof
Two major statistical misunderstandings arise when statistical
findings are introduced into the employment discrimination
courtroom. The main cause for the problem is that the judge must
decide whether the analysis satisfies the traditional common law
standards that govern civil cases. Thus, the ultimate question for
the court is whether the plaintiff has met the requirements of the
prima facie case, namely whether she has sustained her burdens of
production and persuasion which constitute the burden of proof.
5 2
The statistical analysis will thus be examined to determine whether
that burden has been satisfied.5 3
The court's decision that a disparate impact plaintiff has made
a prima facie showing5 4 generally rests on the conclusion that the
51 That is not to say that the greater the confidence coefficient, the more the
court may be "confident" that the results of the hypothesis test are correct. See supra
notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
52 See C. MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 336 (3d ed. 1984). The burden
of production is satisfied if the evidence is such that a reasonable man could infer the
existence of the fact to be proved. A "scintilla" of evidence will not suffice. See id.
§ 338. The burden of persuasion is satisfied in civil cases when the jury finds "proof
by a preponderance" that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than
its nonexistence. See id. § 339.
53 At the prima facie stage, the employer may and often will present statistical
studies that question the conclusions of the plaintiff's statistical analysis. The court's
decision as to whether the plaintiff has satisfied her burden of proof may therefore
be made on the basis of both the plaintiff's and the employer's analysis. EEOC
guidelines, however, impose a heavy burden on employers' statistical analyses,
requiring that there be no more than a one-in-twenty possibility that the correlation
between the test results and job performance could have been by chance. This
indicates that the confidence coefficient generated in the employer's statistical
analysis must be at least equal to 95%. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(5) (1990).
54 In practice, the plaintiff's prima facie showing implies that her statistical
analysis shows a sufficient degree of population/workforce disparity to infer
discrimination, that the results are statistically significant, and that the analysis
presents no flaws such as inaccurate or insufficient data, poor choice of relevant
population, or inappropriate selection or use of a statistical method. See, e.g., Kaye,
Statistical Evidence of Discaiminalion, 77 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 773, 776-82 (1982)
(examining the role of statistics in the prima facie case). Throughout this discussion
it is assumed that the plaintiff's analysis satisfies these requirements, so that the focus
is on the courts' interpretation of the requirement of statistical significance through
the burden of proof. Statistical significance is not always dispositive in employment
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statistical significance of the plaintiff's study matched or exceeded
the corresponding statistical significance that meets the burden of
persuasion. Thus, in disparate impact cases, the traditional claim
that the plaintiff has proved discrimination "by a preponderance of
the evidence" 55 has become a term to express the conclusion that
the plaintiffs statistical analysis satisfies the court's statistical
significance cut-off rules. In fact, courts have applied a 95%
confidence coefficient corresponding to a 5% significance level cut-
off in disparate impact cases.
56
The first problem with this interpretation is that courts have
generally assumed that the confidence coefficient may be equated
with the burden of proof, so that a hypothesis test with a low level
of significance-and thus a high confidence coefficien7-is one in
which the plaintiff has proved her case. The level of statistical
significance, however, merely represents the probability of rejecting
the null hypothesis when it is true, and the confidence coefficient,
its complement, does not necessarily represent the confidence one
has in the accuracy of the hypothesis test. Focusing on statistical
significance and the confidence coefficient, therefore, distorts the
standards of proof that the plaintiff must meet. The court must
focus on power as well, as it represents the probability of correctly
rejecting the null hypothesis.5 8 In fact, this distortion is an
discrimination cases. See, e.g., Boardman & Vining, supra note 50, at 205 (concluding
that the 95% degree of statistical significance of evidence admitted in Albemarle
became one of several criteria for establishing the prima facie case). It is, however,
an issue to which an increasing number of courts have paid attention. See infra notes
56-64 and accompanying text.
55 C. MCCOPMICK, supra note 52.
56 See Palmer v. Schultz, 815 F.2d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Statistical evidence
must meet the 5% level... for it alone to establish a prima facie case under Title
VII."); see also Barnett, An Underestimated Threat to Multiple Regression Analyses Used in
Job Discimination Cases, 5 INDUS. REL. LJ. 156, 168 (1982) ("The most common rule
is that evidence is compelling if and only if the probability the pattern obtained would
have arisen by chance alone does not exceed five percent."); Kaye, supra note 39, at
20 ("[T]here is an understandable tendency on the part of litigants and judges to
demand that quantitative scientific evidence meet some unambiguous test for
acceptance in the scientific community.").
5?See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
58 The confusion between confidence coefficients and accuracy has pervaded the
legal field, in both court opinions and scholarly work. See, e.g., Smith & Abram, supra
note 28, at 41 n.31 (stating that the significance level is a benchmark "level of
confidence that must be met to reject the null hypothesis" of no discrimination"); see
also Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d 1078, 1083 n.7 (4th Cir 1982) (confusing confidence
coefficients with degrees of certainty); National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416,453
n.139 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (misstating the 95% confidence coefficient used in scientific
analyses as a standard of certainty); Kaye, supra note 39, at 21 n.41.
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argument for discarding hypothesis testing altogether and using a
more intuitively understandable probabilistic model.59
The second problem relates to the courts' statistical significance
cut-off to satisfy the burden of proof. The 95% confidence
coefficient cut-off that courts have adopted is a stringent criterion
developed to test scientific conclusions reached on the basis of
imperfect or incomplete data.6 0 It has been adopted for use in
empirical research by the scientific community to test formal
experiments and establish or refute scientific propositions. 6 ' The
effect of setting the statistical significance cut-off, and thus Type I
error, at 5% is that courts will accept a high risk of Type II error.
Indeed, since Type I and II errors are inversely correlated,62
seeking a smaller Type I error will require accepting a larger Type
II error. The effect of importing this purely scientific standard into
a legal context is mostly felt by disparate impact plaintiffs; they are
required to assemble an analysis in which the risk of falsely
inculpating a defendant, that is, Type I risk, is no more than 5%.
6
3
At this juncture then, review of such statistical misconstructions
points to the conclusion that an improved quantification of the
burden of proof in civil trials should "express . . . the legal value
that, if an error is made, it is no worse if a defendant is wrongly
found liable than if it is mistakenly exonerated."
64
This weighty burden has been criticized extensively by schol-
ars. 65 In some instances, courts have applied a less taxing stan-
59 See infra notes 153-66 and accompanying text (discussing probabilistic
interpretation of the burden of proof).
60 See Dawson, supra note 35, at 2.
61 See id.
62 See supra text accompanying note 45.
63 See M. ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN & R. RICHARDS, supra note 28, at 120-21. The
point here is not that the 95% standard requires that the plaintiff prove her case to
95% certainty, as the above discussion has indicated that confidence coefficient is not
equivalent to the burden of persuasion, seesupra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
Rather, the point is that the choice of such a standard "represents a value judgment
within the context of [physical and social science] research as to the relative costs of
incorrectly proclaiming a result on one hand and incorrectly deeming a result not to
have been demonstrated on the other." Cohen, supra note 45, at 412. Indeed, by
adopting this standard which minimizes Type I error and thus increases Type II error,
courts have implicitly acknowledged that it is more important to protect against Type
I "false inculpation" risk than it is to protect against Type II "false exculpation" risk.
See id.
64 M. ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN & R. RictARDs, supra note 28, at 121 (stating that this
standard means that "no important social value difference has been established
between finding an innocent defendant liable and finding a guilty defendant not
liable").
65 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note ,5, at 394 (adopting a 50% standard); Dawson, supra
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dard,66 implicitly acknowledging the difference between the
concept of legal significance and that of statistical significance.
67
Overall, however, very few courts have adopted less stringent
guidelines, thus supporting the argument that courts are ill-
equipped to handle statistical evidence. 68 By admitting statistical
evidence in the form of hypothesis testing into their courtrooms,
judges have boxed themselves into a corner. When they apply
complicated and limited statistical results to a scale of legal
requirements, they misinterpret the burden of proof and hinder the
plaintiff to the benefit of the defendant.
The foregoing analysis indicates that plaintiffs have remained at
a disadvantage in employment discrimination trials. Satisfying the
courts' traditional statistical interpretation of the prima facie rules
is difficult, particularly for a plaintiff with neither the means nor the
capacity to assemble and analyze large amounts of complex data
necessary for a "scientific" analysis. Furthermore, the employer
defendant benefits from greater access to data, employment
records, and in the case of large corporations, a substantial
corporate treasury. Finally, the problem of statistical misinterpreta-
tion exacerbates the structural advantages of the employer in the
disparate impact trial process. Indeed, once the plaintiff has
fulfilled the requirements of a prima facie case, the employer is
note 35, at 2 (arguingagainst a 5% significance standard in civil litigation); Goldstein,
supra note 43, at 47 (arguing that fairness requires that courts take Type II errors into
account); Henkel & McKeown, Unlawful Discrimination and Statistical Proof. An
Analysis, 22 JuRMETRICS J. 34, 57 (1981) (arguing against the 95% standard); Kaye,
supra note 35, at 840-41 (criticizing the Court's handling of statistics in Hazelwood);
Kaye, supra note 39, at 20-21 (comparing legal and scientific standards of proof). But
see I-allock, The Numbes Game-The Use and Misuse of Statistics in Civil Rights Litigation,
23 VILL. L. REV 5, 13 (1977) (arguing in favor of the 5% standard).
6' See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986) ("A plaintiff in a Title
VII suit need not prove discrimination with scientific certainty; rather, his or her
burden is to prove discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence."); Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (stating that the preponderance of the evidence
standard requires litigants to share the risk of error roughly equally); Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (The certainty which a scientist must have
to certify evidence "has never characterized the judicial or the administrative
process.... [T]he standard of ordinary civil litigation, a preponderance of the
evidence, demands only 51% certainty."), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); see also
Kaye, supra note 39, at 21 (arguing that the Ethyl court "was on the right track").
67 Cf. United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 582-84 (10th Cir. 1976) (explicitly
recognizing the distinction between legal and statistical significance). The Test court
concluded that although evidence of discrimination injury selection was statistically
significant it was still too low to meet the court's test of legal significance. See id. at
587.
68 See infra note 122.
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offered the opportunity to rebut the inference of discrimination by
showing that the disputed practice or procedure is justified by
business necessity.
69
The courts' misunderstanding of Type I and Type II errors has
resulted in overly strict requirements for the plaintiff at the prima
facie stage. These statistical requirements do not correspond to the
preponderance of the evidence standard imposed in employment
discrimination trials, due to the judiciary's obsessive focus on
statistical significance as a proxy for the burden of proof.
II. THE WARDS COVE FRAMEWORK
The Supreme Court's traditional disparate impact doctrine
suffered a blow last year, resulting in an even greater reliance on
complex statistical analysis and stricter statistical standards for
aggrieved plaintiffs. In Wards Cove, a mixed disparate impact!
disparate treatment case, the Court held in a five to four decision
that statistical evidence of racial imbalance within a work force did
not alone establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The
plaintiff was required to identify the particular employment practice
that caused the disparity. 70 The Court further ruled that on the
issue of burden allocation, the plaintiff bears the burden of
persuasion throughout the trial with respect to the Title VII claim.
The employer, on the other hand, only bears the burden of
production with respect to the business necessity defense. 7 1 In so
doing, the Wards Cove Court reversed the longstanding disparate
impact theory of Griggs and its progeny that required the defendant
to carry the burden of persuasion with respect to her defense.
72
69 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("The touchstone is
business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.").
Although the extent of the employer's burden was not described in Griggs, until
recently it had been understood that the burden was one of persuasion, and,
therefore, a significant one. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425 (1975) (construing Griggs as mandating a shift of evidentiary burdens similar to
those established in disparate treatment cases). The Court's decision in Wards Cove,
reviewed in the next part of this Comment, interpreted business necessity as a more
lenient standard lying somewhere between a "mere insubstantialjustification" and an
"essential" or "indispensable" one. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 109 S.
Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989).
70 See Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2124.
71 Id. at 2126.
72 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985-86 (1988)
(describing the reallocation of evidentiary burdens).
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Although pending legislation may overturn the case,73 Wards Cove
provides an excellent example of courts' statistical misunderstand-
ings in employment discrimination cases.
The plaintiffs in Wards Cove were nonwhite workers employed
by a number of Alaskan salmon canneries. Unskilled cannery jobs
were filled mainly by nonwhites, while higher paying, skilled
noncannery jobs were filled predominately by white workers. The
plaintiffs, a class of nonwhite cannery workers, brought disparate
treatment and disparate impact Title VII actions alleging that a
number of the employers' hiring practices74 "were responsible for
the racial stratification of the work force, and had denied them and
other nonwhites employment as noncannery workers on the basis of
race."
75
The District Court in Wards Cove entered 172 findings of fact,
rejecting all of the plaintiff's disparate treatment claims, including
the housing and dining discrimination claims. 76 It also rejected
the disparate impact challenges involving subjective employment
criteria to fill noncannery positions on the ground that they were
not subject to attack under disparate impact theory.77 Although
the employer's objective practices were held to be subject to
disparate impact theory, the claims were rejected for failure of
proof.
78
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially
affirmed the court's decision, then withdrew the decision and
73 See infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
74 Among the alleged hiring/promotion practices were: "nepotism, a rehire
preference, a lack of objective hiring criteria, separate hiring channels, [and] a
practice of not promoting from within." Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2120. The
einployees also complained about the employer's racially segregated housing and
dining facilities. See id.
75 Id.
76 See id. at 2120; see also Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 34 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 34,437 (W.D. Wash. 1983). The district court found with respect to housing
that Hardy Parrish, a foreman at one of the canneries, had responded to a written
inquiry about employment by writing:
We are not in a position to take many young fellows to our Bristol Bay
canneries as they do not have the background for our type of employees.
Our cannery labor is either Eskimo or Filipino and we do not have the
facilities to mix others with these groups.
Id. at 33,836 (Finding No. 148). Although the district court concluded that the
plaintiffs' evidence of segregated housing showed by a preponderance of the evidence
facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case, it held that the defendants' evidence
dispelled the inference of discriminatory animus. See id. at 33,843-44.
7 See Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2120.
78 See id.
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ordered the case reheard by the court en banc to settle an intra-
circuit conflict over whether disparate impact theory may be applied
to subjective employment practices. 79  The Ninth Circuit panel
held that plaintiffs may challenge subjective hiring practices using
disparate impact theory, and remanded the case to the appeals
court.8 0 On remand, the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs
had made a prima facie case of disparate impact in hiring for both
skilled and unskilled noncannery positions. The holding was based
solely on the plaintiffs' statistics that showed "racial stratification by
job category."8 1 The appeals court then remanded the case to the
district court with the instructions that the defendant canneries have
the burden of showing that the challenged practices were justified
by business necessity.8 2  The Supreme Court reversed in an
opinion by Justice White8 3 that modified the requirements of the
prima facie and rebuttal stages of disparate impact cases.
A. Prima Facie Case Revisited: The Quest for Accuracy
With respect to the prima facie case, Justice White wrote that
"the cannery work force in no way reflected 'the pool of qualified
job applicants' or the 'qualified population in the labor force,"'
8 4
and that "[t]he 'proper comparison [was] between the racial
composition of [the at-issue jobs] and the racial composition of the
qualified . . . population in the relevant labor market."'8 5 Thus,
the majority held that the court of appeals' approach was flawed,
since it compared the racial composition of two segments of the
employer's work force,8 6 not the racial composition of qualified
79 See Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir.), withdrawn,
787 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1985).
80 See Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1486 (9th Cir. 1987)
(en banc).
81 See Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 1987).
82 See id. at 445.
83 Chiefjustice Rehnquist and justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedyjoined in
Justice White's majority opinion. justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmunjoined
injustice Stevens's dissenting opinion, and justices Brennan and Marshall joined in
Justice Blackmun's dissent. See Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2115.84 Id. at 2122. According to the majority opinion, using the cannery workers as
the "potential 'labor force' for unskilled noncannery positions" was "[t]oo broad
because the vast majority of these cannery workers did not seek jobs in unskilled
noncannery positions .... [and] too narrow because there are obviously many
qualified persons in the labor market for noncannery jobs who are not cannery
workers." Id. at 2123.
85 Id. at 2121 (quoting Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
308 (1977)).86 See id. at 2122 ("Racial imbalance in one segment of an employer's work force
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applicants and that of the segment of the employer's business to
which they applied.8 7 Under this theory, the Court reasoned, the
employer "could be haled into court and forced to engage in the
expensive and time-consuming task" of defending the employment
practices.88 The employer's only escape hatch would be "to adopt
racial quotas, insuring that no portion of his work force deviates in
racial composition," an alternative, the Court stated, that was
expressly rejected in drafting Title VII.
8 9
The Court also maintained a strict causation requirement for
plaintiffs at the prima facie stage, ruling that they must demonstrate
that "specific elements of the [employers'] hiring process have a
significantly disparate impact on nonwhites." 90 Thus, the plaintiffs
were required on remand to show specifically "that each challenged
practice has a significantly disparate impact on employment
opportunities for whites and nonwhites." 91 The Court stated that
this specific causation requirement was justified by the need to
avoid the adverse impact of "employers being potentially liable for
'the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbal-
ances in the composition of their work forces."' 92 According to
the majority, the requirement was minimally onerous to plaintiffs
since liberal discovery rules give employees broad access to
employers' records.
93
does not, without more, establish a prima facie case of disparate impact with respect
to the selection of workers for the employer's other positions").
87 The Court illustrated the problem inherent in the lower court's approach with
a number of examples. The opinion cited the plaintiffs' statistics, indicating that 15%
of new office worker hires and 17% of new medical hires at the cannery were
nonwhite. According to the appeals court, the majority concluded, plaintiffs could
establish a prima facie case of discrimination because 52% of the cannery workers
were nonwhite, even though less than 15-17% of the applicants might be nonwhite
and nonwhites might make up a lower percentage of the qualified labor market. See
id. The flaws of this approach were further illustrated with a reference to the district
court's finding that nonwhites were over-represented among cannery workers,
because the employer contracted with a predominately nonwhite union. Under the
lower court's methodology, the majority explained, the employer would make the
prima facie case "disappear" if it ceased to use Local 37 as its source of cannery hires,
even though its hiring practices remained unchanged. See id. at 2123.
88 Id. at 2122.
89 Id. The Court relied on both the actual statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1988),
and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 449 (1975) (Blackmun,J., concur-
ring) (stating that a quota system is far from the intent of Title VII).
90 Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125.
91 Id.
92 Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988)).
93 See id. The Court addressed the issue of availability of employer records and
concluded that employers falling within the scope of the Uniform Guidelines on
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Although both of these holdings make it more difficult for a
plaintiff to satisfy the prima facie rule, they are not completely
unfounded. Indeed, the Court's first holding correctly recognizes
that it would be unjust to hold the employer liable for having hired
a predominately white work force if none of the applicants for
positions were nonwhite. Yet the choice of a relevant qualified
labor supply is a painstaking process that constitutes a crucial
portion of the plaintiff's analysis, since the disparate impact claim
will turn on whether qualified nonwhites applied for the position.
The plaintiff must select a geographical area that corresponds to the
employer's hiring area and isolate actual and potential applicants
for the jobs at-issue. The plaintiff must then show that the
employer's hiring procedures limited the number of nonwhite hires
by comparing the qualified applicant pool, that is the number of
actual and potential nonwhite applicants, to the number of
nonwhite hires. Demarcating the qualified applicant pool is
particularly difficult, as art accurate study must count the number
of potential or "discouraged" qualified applicants who would have
applied but for their knowledge of the employer's discriminatory
practices. This must be achieved by engaging in a complex
economic and demographic analysis to determine the geographical
scope of the employer's hiring.
The process of determining the qualified applicant pool will
result in a set of figures that is nothing more than a "guesstimate"
of the number of qualified applicants. Because in most cases both
the plaintiff and defendant can adequately justify their choice of the
relevant labor market, it is nearly impossible for the court to
endorse one analysis over an other.94  Indeed, a considerable
Employee Selection Procedures are required to maintain records on the impact of
tests and selection procedures on employment by racial, sexual, or ethnic composi-
tion. See id.
94 Smith and Abram state that:
[t]he labor market area used in deriving the minority... percentage, for
comparison with the employer's actual work force data, often controls the
degree of disparity between minority ... employment data and the
comparison statistic. Egregious displays of gerrymandering characterize
litigation and compliance proceedings. Plaintiffs... commonly argue that
geographic boundaries encompassing the highest concentrations of
minorities... should apply, while defendants construct geographic areas for
comparison purposes which have relatively low concentrations of minorities
.... No general agreement exists, however, on the standards which should
govern the geographic scope of the labor market area.
Smith & Abram, supra note 28, at 59-60 (footnote omitted).
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number of courts have struggled with the need to compare the
racial composition of the employer's labor force to that of an
accurate set of potential applicants. Thus, the Court's quest for
scientific accuracy in data selection is misguided, as the analysis will
often hinge on too many statistical and economic assumptions to
make it accurate. Ultimately, the prevailing party in a disparate
impact action will have proven to the Court that her data selection
was more reasonable than that of her opponent, not that her
statistical results were factually correct.
The majority's pursuit of accuracy is also apparent in its
discussion of the prima facie case causation requirements. Stating
that it is insufficient to claim "bottom line" discrimination, 95 the
Court held that plaintiffs must show how specific elements of the
hiring process have a significant disparate impact on nonwhites.
0
The degree of specificity required by the Court is unclear. The
Wards Cove plaintiffs had in fact claimed that certain identifiable
hiring practices violated Title VII;9 7 they did not make an amor-
phous claim of discrimination.
Certainly, the fact that the plaintiffs were able to isolate
identifiable factors that were at the root of the employer's alleged
discrimination should have weighed in their favor. It is generally
difficult to isolate the causes of racial disparity in an employer's
work force. Plaintiffs must first act on their intuition and attempt
to identify the major types of hiring procedures that caused the
disparity. The next step is confirming their intuition with a
coherent statistical study. If the study fails to verify intuition, the
plaintiffs must seek out other possible causes. In some instances,
the employee may have no intuitive indication of the source of the
disparity. This may be the case, for example, if the employer is an
institution or a large corporation whose rules and procedures
appear fair on their face, but are in fact implemented collectively in
a complex regulatory web that results in hiring discrimination.
The majority's imposition of strict causation requirements is a
second attempt at inducing the plaintiff to present an air-tight
prima facie case. This lofty standard of causation is nearly impossi-
ble for plaintiffs to meet. Indeed, civil case law generally has been
based on the principle that "[a]lthough the causal link must have
95 See Wards Cove, 109S. Ct. at 2124 (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, ,150
(1982)).
96 See id.
97 See supra note 74.
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substance, the act need not constitute the sole or primary cause of
the harm."9 8 This notion is consistent with the preponderance of
the evidence standard of proof applied in civil cases. Courts have
loosened this causation standard in instances where the burden of
proving causation is particularly heavy, such as in large-scale
product liability actions.-'9 It would therefore appear that the
Court has imposed stricter causation requirements for disparate
impact plaintiffs than for other types of plaintiffs.
The Wards Cove majority is striving for a disparate impact
framework in which the plaintiff will present the most accurate
statistical statement of disparate impact to prove her prima facie
case. This puts an unfair burden on the plaintiff by requiring her
to bear the risk of error, "t° ° and strains the legal system by deny-
ing the reality that statistics can be manipulated to state a conclu-
sion based on a set of possibly unwarranted assumptions. Statistical
analyses do not result in a conclusion that is "right or wrong," but
rather a set of conclusions whose accuracy is based on the validity
of the assumption underlying the statistical analysis, the soundness
of the analysis, and the "quality" of the set of observations that is
run through the statistical model. For that reason, strict statistical
guidelines on data and causation will not necessarily generate
accurate analyses. They may lead plaintiffs and defendants to
engage in a war of statistics which will confuse the trier of fact.
Alternatively, they may simply deter plaintiffs with genuine causes
of action from bringing suit, for fear that their statistical analysis
does not justify a finding of discrimination.
Taken as a whole, Wards Cove is quite troubling. Indeed, the
Wards Cove majority also redefined the burden the employer must
meet in the business justification phase of a disparate impact case.
The court held that "the employer carries the burden of producing
evidence of a business justification for his employment prac-
tice." 10 1 In so doing, the Court relied on Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion in Watson, which introduced a more lenient
interpretation of the employer's burden in the business justification
phase. 10 2  Thus, the majority explicitly rejected prior case
98 Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431-433 (1965)).
99 See infra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
100 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
10 Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 (emphasis added).
l0 2 Justice O'Connor's framework in the Watson plurality opinion provided that
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law, 10 3 stating that "to the extent that those cases speak of an
employer's 'burden of proof' with respect to a legitimate business
justification defense.., they should have been understood to mean
an employer's production-but not persuasion-burden."
1 0 4
Thus, Wards Cove now requires the plaintiff to isolate accurately
the qualified applicant pool in the geographic and economic
perimeter of the employer, identify the specific causes for the
disparity, and show that those causes are the source of racial
disparity through a statistical study that satisfies strict scientific
statistical testing standards. The defendant may then rebut the case
by introducing business justification evidence that is more than
"insubstantial."10 5 It is difficult to see why an individual claiming
a Title VII disparate impact harm would ever file suit against the
employer when the odds of her prevailing are, in theory, quite slim.
In practice, it is conceivable that Wards Cove has not eradicated
disparate impact theory. Civil rights activists and attorneys disagree
over the impact of the ruling on future employment discrimination
cases. 10 6 Still, the case has undoubtedly had an immediate impact
when a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of disparate impact, and
when the defendant has met its burden of producing evidence that its
employment practices are based on legitimate business reasons, the plaintiff
must 'show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest
in efficient and trustworthy workmanship.'
Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,425
(1975)).
103 See Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that this
new framework "casual[ly]-almost summar[il]y" overruled a line of cases that "always
have emphasized that in a disparate impact case the employer's burden is weighty").
'04 Id. at 2126 (citation omitted). The Court described this burden as a "reasoned
review of the employer's justification for his use of the challenged practice ....
There is no requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable'
to the employer's business for it to pass muster...." Id.
105 Id.
106 See The Supreme Cour 1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137, 356
n.37 (1989) ("[Wards Cove] 'does not make it impossible to prove [disparate impact]
cases, but makes it more difficult. The important point about Griggs was that once
you carried the prima facie case, the burden shifted and it was a tremendous
litigation advantage.'" (quoting Penda Hair of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, in Stewart, Civil Rights: Just a Trim?, A.B.A.J., Aug. 1989, at 44));
Speakers at Dallas Meeting Assess Impact of Supreme Court's 1988-89 EEO Decisions, 199
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-7 (Oct. 17, 1989) (quoting University of Michigan law
professor, Theodore St. Antoine, as stating that Wards Cove will make it more
difficult, but not impossible to prove Title VII disparate impact cases); Is the High
Court Hiding Reversals on Rights? Nat'l L.J., June 19, 1989, at 5, 38, col. 1 (quoting
Isabelle Katz Pinzler of the ACLU as stating that "the doors of opportunity opened
by Griggs have been slammed shut").
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on recent disparate impact claims, as a number of courts have
recently ruled on Title VII actions based on the Wards Cove
framework.
10 7
In any case, the bearing of Wards Cove on disparate impact
theory may be temporary, given the current legislative push to
overturn the case.10 8 Both the House of Representatives 0 9 and
the Senate l l° recently passed civil rights legislation that could
have overturned the Court's decision, had it not been successfully
vetoed by the President."' President Bush sent an alternative
version of the civil rights bill to Congress in an effort to develop an
acceptable version of the bill. 112 Although enacting such legisla-
tion would rectify some of the inconsistencies of the Wards Cove
opinion, it most likely would not correct courts' general misunder-
standings of statistical evidence in employment discrimination cases.
107 Wards Cove has caused a number of courts to deny relief on workplace
discrimination claims. See, e.g., Zamlen v. Cleveland, 906 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1990)
(finding that a firefighter qualifying exam did not discriminate against female
applicants); Walls v. Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990) (upholding the
discharge of a black employee who failed to complete an intrusivejob questionnaire).
But see Nash v. Jacksonville, 905 F.2d 355 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that a fire
department promotion test violated Title VII). A number of circuit courts have
remanded cases for consideration under the Wards Cove doctrine. See, e.g., EEOC v.
Joint Apprenticeship Comm. of theJoint Indus. Bd. of the Elec. Indus., 895 F.2d 86
(2d Cir. 1990); Evans v. City of Evanston, 881 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1989); Allen v.
Seidman, 881 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1989).
108 The Minnesota legislature has expanded its workplace discrimination laws
partly in response to Wards Cove. The relevant portion of the legislation requires that
employers "prove that an employment practice that has a significant adverse impact
on a particular protected class is manifestly related to thejob or significantly furthers
an important business purpose." Minnesota Law Reverses Impact of 1989 U.S. Supreine
Court Civil Rights Rulings, 95 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-17 (May 16, 1990); see also
Human Rights-Discriminatory Practices Amendments, S.F. No. 1847, 1990 Minn.
Sess. Law. Serv. 961, 967 (West) (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 363.03.11).
109 See House Approves Civil Rights Bill; Administration Position Still Unclear, 151
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-6 (Aug. 6, 1990).
110 See Senate Passes Civil Rights Bill 65-34; Sponsors, White House Voice Hope for
Coinpro nise, 140 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-9 (Jul. 20, 1990).
111 See Bush Vetoes Rights Bil Sends Alternative to Bil 205 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
A-A (Oct. 23, 1990) [hereinafter Bush Vetoes Bill]. The Bush Administration's
opposition to the bill has focused on the possibility that the provisions relating to
Wards Cove would effectively create hiring quotas for employers. See Bush Opposition
to Civil Rights Legislation Focuses on Wards Cove Provisions, Fletcher Says, 95 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) A-13 (May 16, 1990); see also New President of American Bar Association
Disputes Bush Administration Stand on Quotas, 154 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-3 (Aug. 9,
1990).
112 This compromise bill is, according to President Bush, intended to "strike a
blow against racial bias, without institutionalizing quotas." Bush Vetoes Bill, supra note
111, at A-A.
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B. The Wards Cove Dilemma: Integrating Law and Statistics
It is unwise to attempt to evaluate the logical reasoning of a
Supreme Court opinion from a purely statistical standpoint.
Indeed, the Court often tiptoes through issues, framing the logic of
the opinion with subtleties and nuances that may not be translated
statistically.11 3 Its opinions must balance considerations of public
policy, national values, and stare decisis. In Wards Cove, the Court
altered the prior disparate impact law of Griggs and its progeny by
including specific causation requirements in its analysis of the
plaintiff's burden of proof, justifying its departures on the ground
that employers must be protected from frivolous claims. 114  The
logic and structure of this opinion is thus not uncharacteristic of
Supreme Court opinions.
115
Wards Cove, then, might be read as a simple reversal of policy
concerning civil rights, a decision resting on grounds of public
policy rather than considerations of statistical theory. To be sure,
the Court's opinion makes no specific claims with respect to such
theory. Yet disparate impact actions are so thoroughly intertwined
with statistical evidence that the opinion is in effect a pronounce-
ment on the probative value of statistical analysis. As such, the
Wards Cove majority has placed itself in the unenviable position of
challenging accepted statistical norms. The Court's strict guidelines
regarding the plaintiff's data selection and proof of specific
causation, combined with its lax burden requirements for the
employer are such that scientifically significant findings may be
rebutted in court by reasonable business justifications. This blatant
imbalance is troubling, as the Court's framework sends the message
to protected classes and employers that even when discriminatory
impact has been determined to exist in the workplace, it will be
tolerated. Wards Cove thus makes a bad system worse.
116
11 To put it more eloquently, "[s]ometimes the Court paints with broad strokes,
splashing color across the canvas as boldly as any Abstract Expressionist. Sometimes
it draws delicately, the results as fragile and fine as a Persian miniature, precise as
Pointillism, or filled with Renaissance shadings of light and shadow." Greenhouse,
Supreme Court's Style: A SeeringRichness in Diversity, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1990, at A18,
col. 5.
114 See Wards Cove 109 S. Ct. at 2125.
115 Indeed, the presence of statistical reasoning in the Wards Cove opinion is not
an isolated occurrence. The rise in the prestige and authority of scientific theory is
eroding the conception that law is an autonomous discipline. See Posner, The Decline
of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 772-73 (1987).
116 The traditional requirements for satisfying the disparate impact prima facie
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Although the Wards Cove holding is statistically troubling, it is
only the most recent of a number of cases that have misapprehend-
ed the role of statistics in the law. 117 Courts can hardly be faulted
for misapplying statistics in the legal context, however, since law
and statistics do not mix well. 118 The logic of legal reasoning is
based on the use of terms such as the "burden of proof" and the
"prima facie case," while the logic of statistical reasoning operates
on quantitative evidence of probabilities, confidence coefficients,
and statistical significance. When judges are confronted with
statistical evidence, they are forced to define mathematically those
terms of art so as to determine whether the quantitative evidence
satisfies the legal standard. 119 It is a nearly impossible task, as
judges often misapprehend important statistical principles,
120
disagree on the significance of legal terms, 12 1 and sometimes
operate on misguided assumptions. 122 Indeed, studies in the
quantification of standards of proof have shown that subjective
interpretations of the standard vary widely among judges. 123 The
case also were difficult for the plaintiff to meet. Even under Griggs, the plaintiff's
analysis usually had to satisfy a 95% statistical significance cut-off rule. See supra note
56 and accompanying text.
117 See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Western Electric Co., 713 F.2d 1011, 1019 (4th Cir. 1983)
(misconstruing standard deviation analysis); Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 965 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (accepting plaintiff's statistical evidence as probative although it was
inconclusive); see also Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 284-85 (1950) (undertaking an
erroneous statistical analysis in a grand jury discrimination case); Commissioner v.
Indiana Broadcasting Corp., 350 F.2d 580,582-83 (7th Cir. 1965) (misunderstanding
the "Poisson distribution"), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
118 See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 39, at 13 (arguing that "[i]n most endeavors
concerned with the acquisition of knowledge, quantitative information is wel-
comed .... [while in] law, however, it appears sometimes that scientific or numerical
evidence makes cases harder, not easier.").
119 This may be why "[t]he idea that formal hypothesis tests should or must be
used to assist the judge or jury... is a recent phenomenon. Before 1970, almost no
federal cases adverted to 'statistically significant' evidence." Kaye, supra note 30, at
1334.
120 See supra note 117.
121 See Goldberg, On Legal and Matheinatical Reasoning 22 JURIMETRICS J. 83, 85
(1981) ("[J]udges often disagree not only on specific axioms but on entire classes of
axioms.").
122 See, e.g., id. ("The problem is not that judges sometimes make errors in logic;
published mathematical proofs are not invariably free of that vice. The problem is
rather the shabby conditions of the axioms used by the judge." (footnote omitted)).
121 See United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (reporting
an informal survey of tenjudges' quantitative interpretation of the burden of proof),
affd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980). Fatico indicates
that although all of the judges translated the civil standard of proof into values in
excess of 0.50, they gave values ranging from 0.76 to 0.90 for the criminal standard.
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impact of these misinterpretations has, over time, bean borne by the
disparate impact plaintiff.
The purposes of legal and scientific reasoning also account for
the imperfect nature of court decisions with respect to statistical
evidence. Court decisions constitute an instrument of social policy
that serves to draw lines between what is permissible and impermis-
sible. For that reason, majority opinions must convey a sense of
certainty and finality, to communicate the idea that they are writing
the rule of law.1 24 The Supreme Court is particularly confronted
with this problem, as its opinions will serve as a guide to lower
courts.1 25  Statistical studies are, on the. other hand, a form of
free scientific debate designed to draw conclusions concerning a
given area. Statisticians compile their data, select mathematical
methods to analyze the data, and derive conclusions based on the
analysis. Any of these steps may be and usually are criticized by
experts who disagree on the mechanics of the statistical analysis.
While such scientific debate is encouraged for its societal benefits
of truth and understanding, Supreme Court opinions are rarely
debated for this purpose.
26
Judges thus must have a solid understanding of statistical
reasoning if they are to become experts in "jurimetrics." Yet
because they are subject to case precedent and authority, they do
not have the luxury to rule as statisticians. Theirs is a difficult role.
Whether the disparate impact framework may effectively be
modified to simplify this role is the subject of Part III, which
proposes a more straightforward approach to the review of statistics
in disparate impact litigation.
See id.; see also Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof. A View From the Bench,
theJuly, and the Classroom, 5 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 319, 324-25 (1971) (reporting similar
values for the civil standard, but finding that about one third ofjudges believe the
criminal standard to be equivalent to a probability of 1.0).
124 See Note, Sources ofJudicial Distrust of Social Science Evidence: A Comparison of
Social Science andJurisprudence, 64 IND. LJ. 755, 757 (1989).
125 For the Supreme Court "[t]o decide a case too narrowly is to squander the
Court's resources; to rule too broadly is to squander its legitimacy. The tension is
inherent in the system ofjudicial review." Greenhouse, supra note 113, at A18, col.
5.
126 The debate over legal doctrine is not conducted on the premise-which holds
true among scientists-that if the doctrine is shown to be illogical by its critics, its
conclusions will no longer hold true and the doctrine will be abandoned. At best, the
Court may subsequently overrule the doctrine, though rarelybecause it is unpopular.
In any case, legal scholarly debate focuses instead on understanding and interpreting
the Court's reasoning which is often left vague for the reasons outlined above. See
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III. SIMPLIFYING DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
A. The Objective of a Simpler Model
The main purpose of simplifying the disparate impact frame-
work is to allow judges to make legal decisions in a consistent and
straightforward fashion. Such an approach would partially relieve
the plaintiff of the particularly heavy burden that she shoulders
throughout the disparate impact case. In practice, this means
devising a model in which the risks of error are borne equally by
both the plaintiff and defendant throughout the litigation. The
model must also offer fairly relaxed data and causation rules that
are consistent with the preponderance of the evidence standard.
Since the touchstone of such a model is consistency with the
traditional preponderance of the evidence standard, the model
should dispel the fears of frivolous litigation raised by the Court in
Wards Cove. Indeed, if the model is consistent with the traditional
preponderance of the evidence standard, then frivolous litigation
will be no more likely than it is in other types of civil litigation. The
result of applying this standard is that, in short, the party that has
displayed the more cogent analysis will prevail. Thus, the employer
will also gain from any benefits realized by the plaintiff as she will
never be drawn into court unless the plaintiff's statistical case meets
the preponderance of the evidence standard. The plaintiff's ability
to build such a case implies not an instance of frivolous litigation,
but the existence of a wrong to be corrected.
Ironically, such a model must make minimal use of statistics to
avoid the aforementioned problems of trying a case that draws on
vague legal terminology and complex statistical evidence. It should
embody the values of the community, 127 so as to prevent the need
for accuracy in statistics from distorting the legal decision.
28
Indeed, any statistical or mathematical system of proof requires that
certain assumptions be made as to how lines will be drawn between
"right and wrong" or "true and false." In the above analysis, for
example, it was demonstrated that courts have forced plaintiffs to
bear a particularly large degree of risk, by requiring that their
127 See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1392 (1971).
128 See, e.g., People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 320, 438 P.2.d 33, 33, 66 Cal. Rptr.
497,497 (1968) (noting that "[m]athematics, averitable sorcerer in our computerized
society, while assisting the trier of fact in the search for truth, must not [be allowed
to] cast a spell over him").
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statistical analyses satisfy a 5% statistical significance test.1 29 This
requirement deviates from the principle behind the traditional
preponderance of the evidence standard, which is the product of
the values that have shaped our legal system. Thus, it may be
argued that this requirement must be changed, as any model of
statistical proof must be consistent with such values. Such a change
will ensure that all civil cases are adjudicated according to the same
standard.
Finally, an improved statistical model must also be straightfor-
ward, so that the important variables behind the analysis are not
hidden behind a misleading "black and white" conclusion, such as
that generated by hypothesis testing. Ultimately, the model must
release the mind of the trier of fact from the confines of complex
quantitative analysis, as '.[t]he main role of models is not so much
to explain and to predict-though ultimately these are the main
functions of science-as to polarize thinking and to pose sharp
questions." 1
3 0
B. The Legal Precedent for Simplification
In recent years, scholars have devised a number of legal
decision-making models in their pursuit of a more equitable legal
system. At the same time, courts have been faced with the need to
adjudicate complex cases of sometimes exceedingly large propor-
tions, the resolution of which has required much statistical evidence.
These modern-day legal Goliaths have been, for the most part, in
the form of antitrust and products liability suits. Responding to this
challenge, courts and scholars have devised a number of theories to
encourage the prompt and fair resolution of such civil actions. The
purpose of these algebraic, statistical, and probabilistic models is to
simplify legal reasoning and improve the framework in which the
legal system can use quantitative evidence. They provide a basis for
developing a straightforward disparate impact framework model.
129 See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
130 Comment, Mathematical Models of Legal Rules: Application, Exploitation, and
Inte)piretation, 13 CONN. L. REV. 33, 82 (1980) (quoting Kac, Some Mathematical Models
in Science, 166 SCIENCE 695, 699 (1979)) (emphasis added).
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1. The Hand Negligence Model
One of the oldest instances of the use of simplified formulas in
the legal process is Learned Hand's negligence model described in
United States v. Carroll Towing Co.: 1
l
[T]he owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide
against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The
probability that [a moored ship] will break away; (2) the gravity of
the resulting injury, if [the ship] does; (3) the burden of adequate
precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to
state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the
injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends on whether B is less
than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [is less than] PL.1
32
The model was subsequently applied in a number of negligence
cases, 133 and in the less obvious context of a First Amendment
action. 13 4  It provided a simple framework with which judges
could interpret the often hazy notions of duty and breach. The
pitfall of the model was its simplified reliance on the difficult task
of estimating probabilities and harm. Yet it provided a necessary
analytical framework, since "[w]ithout such a generalization, it
would be impossible to resolve many theoretical and practical
questions without tortuous and, in most cases, nonreplicable
analysis."'13 5
2. The Expected Value Rule
An offshoot of the Hand model has emerged in the form of the
"expected value rule." 36  Expected value theorists question the
13' 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
132 Id. at 173.
133 See, e.g., Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964, 981 (1st Cir. 1977) (applying
model to supertanker oil spill), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 941 (1978); Andros Shipping Co.
v. Panama Canal Co., 298 F.2d 720, 725-26 (5th Cir. 1962) (involving damages
sustained when a ship ran aground); Rosenquist v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 486,
489 (2d Cir. 1953) (applying model to seaman's personal injury suit); see also
Comment, supra note 130, at 54-55 (reviewing the use of the Hand rule by the
courts).
134 See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (1950) (questioning "whether
the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies [an] invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger"), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); see also
Comment, supra note 130, at 65-66 (discussing the apparent influence of the Hand
model in the Dennis decision).
135 Comment, supra note 130, at 40.
136 See Orloff & Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-
Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (1983).
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traditional legal framework which provides full recovery when the
probability of events having taken place is greater than 50%, and
denies recovery when the probability is less than 50%.137 They
advocate the expected value rule which calculates damages "by
multiplying the probability that the defendant is culpable by the
magnitude of the damages."138 If, for example, the damages are
in the amount of $100 and the plaintiff has proven the harm to a
49% certainty she will recover $49, while under the traditional
preponderance of the evidence standard she will not recover at all.
If the plaintiff proves her case to 51% certainty she will recover $51,
while under the traditional "all-or-nothing" preponderance of the
evidence standard she would recover the full $100. Thus, the model
strives to minimize Type I error, the risk of incorrectly finding for
the defendant, and Type II error, the risk of incorrectly finding for
the plaintiff.13 9 Such a goal is worthwhile, for the above example
shows that under the preponderance of the evidence standard, a 2%
difference in the degree of certainty that the defendant is culpable
may be the difference between no recovery and full recovery for the
plaintiff.
Analyses of the expected value rule have drawn mixed conclu-
sions. Two scholars have conducted a series of tests to determine
whether this model is preferable to traditional preponderance of the
evidence theory and have concluded that neither model is prefera-
ble in all circumstances.1 40 Another has argued that the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard should be applied except in
situations in which the probability that the defendant caused the
harm never changes from case to case. 141 In that situation, the
expected value theory is the error-minimizing alternative.
142
137 See id. at 1159-60.
138 Id. at 1160.
139 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
140 Professors Orloff and Stedinger conclude that
[i]f the goal is to minimize the number of erroneously decided cases or the
sum of the wrongful payments that are made, the preponderance-of-the-
evidence rule emerges as the superior choice. However, if the goal is to
minimize making large errors or to avoid bias in the distribution of the
errors among plaintiffs and defendants, the expected value rule emerges as
the superior choice.
Orloff & Stedinger, supra note 136, at 1172.
141 See Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably
Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 48'7, 514-
15.
142 See id. at 514 n.76 (stating that the expected value theory best applies in
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The expected value rule suffers from some of the same problems
as the Hand formula, namely its reliance on quantification of the
harm and the probability that the harm was caused by the defen-
dant's negligence. Furthermore, it is unlikely to gain favor among
the legal community because the preponderance of the evidence
standard is ingrained in our legal tradition, and the injection of an
additional issue would further complicate an already overburdened
legal system.143 The untraditional nature of the expected value
rule makes its application in court unlikely, so that it does not
provide a workable theoretical basis for a new disparate impact
doctrine.
3. Market Share Liability
In the early 1980s, an inferential model of causation gained
favor in a number of courts. In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 
144
the plaintiff brought a class action against eleven drug companies
that had manufactured and marketed diethylstilbestrol, commonly
known as DES. 145 The plaintiff alleged having been harmed by
the drug, but could not identify which company had manufactured
the DES that had caused her injuries. 4 6 The trial court dismissed
the action, and the California Supreme Court reversed, holding that
if the plaintiff could prove her allegations of negligence and
damages, she would be entitled to recover from each of the
companies in proportion to their percentage share of the statewide
DES market.
147
The DES causation framework apportions fault on the basis of
the actual market shares of the various defendant drug companies,
thus relieving the plaintiff of the burden of identifying the company
which actually manufactured and marketed the particular sample
that was responsible for the plaintiffs harm. Identifying the
responsible defendant can be a painstaking process, as it requires
situations in which there is a very 'real possibility of repeated recovery from the same
defendant," such as in DES cases since in those cases, the single largest marketer of
DES in California "could be held liable for every DES-caused injury in California").
For a discussion of market share liability, which may be used to solve the same
problem, see infra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
143 See Orloff & Stedinger, supra note 136, at 1174.
14 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
145 See id. at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
146 See id.
147 See id. at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
A COHERENT DISPARATE IMPACT MODEL
the plaintiff to determine the origin of the DES that~harmed her.
Responding to this practical difficulty, the court allowed the
plaintiff to prevail based on a showing of negligence and harm,
inferring the causation element of her tort claim.
One of the problems of the market share liability model is that
it does not focus on the probability that a particular defendant
caused the harm. As the dissent in Sindell indicated, "a particular
defendant may be held proportionately liable even though mathemati-
cally it is much more likely than not that it played no role whatever in
causing plaintiffs' injuries." 148  Three scholars have advocated
adopting a probabilistic approach to multiple causation harms.
1 49
One proposed model would apportion fault among multiple
tortfeasors on the basis of their "probabilistic marginal prod-
uct," 150 that is, "their relative marginal contributions to the risk of
harm suffered by the plaintiff," '5 '
The pitfall of the DES probability model is that both parties are
still required to calculate probabilities which may not be very
accurate. Furthermore, probability analysis does nothing to alleviate
the war of statistics between the plaintiff and the defendant, as both
parties will introduce statistical evidence in court to buttress their
probabilistic assessments. Nevertheless, the probability model is a
more intuitively understandable framework because it avoids the
black hole of hypothesis testing.
The difficulties of proof faced by a DES plaintiff are not unlike
those of a disparate impact plaintiff. Determining the exact
composition of the statewide market for a widely used pharmaceuti-
cal product is no more difficult than isolating the precise origins of
a rule that causes a disparate impact on protected groups and
showing specifically how it causes such an impact. The wide
148 Id. at 616, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
149 See Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic
Theomy, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1428-29 (1980); Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort
Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713, 759-60 (1982).
150 Rizzo & Arnold, supra note 149, at 1406 n.39.
151 Robinson, supra note 149, at 759. Such a model may be applied to a disparate
impact hypothetical. Assume a plaintiff claims that, the employer has turned down
her job application for a position as a security guard on the basis of a hiring
procedure that has a disparate impact with regard to gender. If the court finds that
the relative apportionment of probable causes of the disparity in workforce hiring is
65% due to a height requirement that is not a valid business justification, 10% due
to the structure of the local union, and 25% due to the justified need to hire
individuals without a criminal record, then under a multiple causation probabilistic
model, the plaintiff will recover 65% of her damages.
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discrepancy in the standards required of DES claimants and those
required of disparate impact plaintiffs supports the argument that
the legal system is less willing to insulate the employer/
manufacturer from claims by consumers than from those by job
applicants. Consistency in the law requires that the relaxed
causation standards must also be applied to disparate impact
plaintiffs. 152  Adoption of the DES causation framework is an
important precedent for formulating a simpler and fairer disparate
impact framework.
C. The Value of Probabilistic Analysis
The analysis in Part 1' of this Comment regarding the use of
hypothesis testing in the courtroom indicates that its complexities
and statistical nuances are ill-suited to judicial decision-making.
Even if the system were improved to guard against the statistical
fallacies perpetuated over the years by courts, it is likely that such
an overhaul would merely complicate the already confused eviden-
tiary process of disparate impact cases. The solution is to search for
a new framework that will both conform to the conventional
standard for the burden of persuasion applied in civil trials and
allow the judge to interpret inferential statistical evidence more
easily. Thus, such a framework should prevent the judge from
being overwhelmed by complex statistical analyses whose effect may
be to convey the often false impression that they are always
accurate.
The above review of alternate statistical theories indicates that
the statistical evidence should take the form of likelihoods, thus
lessening the current focus of courts on significance levels and
hypothesis testing. Probabilistic analysis is intuitively more
understandable than hypothesis testing, although the latter theory
has been more widely used by courts.15 3 The relative disuse of
probability theory is likely due to the legal system's fixation on
"black and white" decisions of culpability, similar to the bottom-line
152 Neither the traditional Grigs nor the current Wards Cove disparate impact
framework reaches even the minimum level of fairness applied in standard civil trials.
See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. To quote Justice Stevens, "[o]rdinary
principles of fairness require that Title VII actions be tried like 'any lawsuit.'" Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2133 (1989) (StevensJ, dissenting).
153 See, e.g., Aickin, supra note 28, at 385 ("In trying to cope with the infusion of
data analytic technicalities into the courts, lawyers and judges have tried to become
statisticians. They would do much better by trying to become probabilists.").
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conclusions of hypothesis testing. 54 Use of a probabilistic frame-
work will allow the judge both to gauge correctly the somewhat
tenuous nature of the statistical evidence and to avoid stretching the
meaning of such evidence beyond the interpretation given by
statisticians. 155 Such a result will neither deter plaintiffs from
satisfying the prima facie case nor discourage defendants from
rebutting it, since the framework will impose on both parties the
probabilistic interpretation of the preponderance of the evidence
standard. Thus, the model will accomplish its ultimate goal, namely
peaceful cohabitation of legal constructs and statistical evidence in
the disparate impact trial process.
1. Quantifying and Applying the Burden of Proof
Advocates of probabilistic decisionmaking generally agree that
the preponderance of the evidence standard applied in civil trials
translates in probabilistic terms to a test in which the court rules for
the plaintiff if the probability of the existence of facts indicating
liability exceeds 0.5.156 Thus, the plaintiff satisfies her burden by
introducing evidence that satisfies this test. Although such a test
would appear to be easily applied in the courtroom, some scholars
indicate that quantification of the burden of proof does not fit into
the concept of legal decisionmaking.
1-4 See supra text accompanying note 32; cf. M. ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN & R.
RICHARDS, supra note 28, at 117 (stating that "[p]robability is the basis of the science
of statistics," and therefore of hypothesis testing). In other words, the probabilities
generated by statistical analysis should not be analyzed in the traditional hypothesis
testing framework. Hypothesis testing generates misleadingly black and white
conclusions that an original null hypothesis of no discrimination must either be
accepted or rejected. An improved framework will examine the statistical analysis
from a purely probabilistic standpoint, thus allowing the trier of fact to rank the
analysis on a spectrum of confidence.
The utility of a probability function stems from the fact that it "contains all the
information that the statistical findings can convey. It forces the fact-finder to
confront all the hypotheses concerning the parameters of a probability distribution,
and it avoids the arbitrary character of hypothesis testing at a uniform significance
level." Kaye, supra note 35, at 852.
156 See, e.g., Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence (Book Review), 89 YALE LJ. 601, 609
(1980) ("I wish to argue for the orthodox view that a party shoulders its burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence by persuading the finder of fact that the
probability in question exceeds one-half."); see also Cohen, supra note 45, at 394; Kaye,
Naked Statistical Evidence, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 487, 493; Martin & Schum,
Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A Likelihood Ratio Approach, 27JURIMETRICSJ. 383, 388
(1987) (quantifying the criminal standard of the burden of proof).
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This problem may be illustrated with an example. Suppose 499
of 1,000 people in attendance at a rodeo have paid the admission
price, while the remaining 501 are gatecrashers. Assume further
that there is no way of distinguishing the paying customers from the
gatecrashers. If the proprietor of the rodeo brings suit against any
spectator to recover the lost admission charge, and if the only pieces
of evidence are the above statistics of paying and non-paying
audience, then according to the probability model, the proprietor
will presumably recover against all those in attendance. This
example, known as the "paradox of the gatecrasher," 157 demon-
strates how probabilistic analysis may run counter to accepted
judicial principles which would prohibit recovery in this in-
stance.
158
This argument highlights the difficulties of applying statistical
and mathematical models in the legal system. Such models,
however, need only be used as a guide rather than a tool that will
be dispositive of the outcome of a case. 159 Indeed, one advantage
of probability theory is that it highlights possible fallacious court
rulings that might remain hidden if the court were solely dealing
with evidence in the form of hypothesis testing. Thus, although the
paradox of the gatecrasher does present a situation in which a guilty
verdict will cause injustice to the paying audience, it does not
weaken the case for using probability analysis in court. Probability
analysis is not as desirable for its accuracy as it is for its clarity. The
st.rength of probability analysis is that the trier of fact will be better
able to identify borderline situations such as that of the gatecrasher
hypothetical. Once the probability is identified, it will be an
additional piece of evidence that the trier of fact will consider in her
decision-making process.
The temptation to employ probabilistic models as black boxes
rather than guideposts stems from the perception that mathematical
analyses generate pinpointed solutions to problems. This, however,
stems from "confusion between the precision that is characteristic
157 See L. COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROvABLE 75 (1977).
158 See Cohen, supra note 45, at 395; Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of
the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 34, 38-39 (1979).
159 See supra note 28. Such an approach may be problematic when dealing with
so-called "pure impact" employment discrimination cases, in which only statistical
evidence is presented at trial. Since no other evidence is available in such a case,
probabilistic evidence becomes determinative of the outcome of the suit. The
problem of analysis of"naked statistical evidence" is discussed infra notes 188-96 and
accompanying text.
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of mathematical analysis of uncertainty, and precise quantitative or
numerical values." 160 Indeed, it is possible to give a mathematical
statement assessing a probability between 30% and 40%, as
mathematical analysis does not necessarily require exact preci-
sion.1 61  From this perspective, probabilistic analysis is most
useful in employment discrimination litigation. The probabilities
may guide, not enslave the trier of fact, if they are used as general
indicators of the probability that employment discrimination has
taken place.'
62
2. The Subjectivist/Frequentist Controversy
Use of probabilities in law is also debated on philosophical
grounds by the two major schools of probabilistic theory. The belief
that one must be cautious in interpreting statistics is shared by the
"subjectivist" school of statisticians. Subjectivists argue that a
statistically measured probability is actually a measure of the
statistician's "degree of belief that the event ... is or will turn out
to be true."1 63 Thus, subjectivist probabilities may be viewed as
"the odds an individual would be willing to accept in betting on the
outcome of an event .... "164
Frequentists, on the other hand, believe that the probability
indicates the relative frequency with which the predicted outcome
would be observed if the operation were repeated a large number
of times.1 65 Thus, while the frequentist interpretation of a con-
clusion that an event has a certain probability of occurrence is in
the form of an objective prediction about future repetitions, the
subjectivist would claim that the probability is a "property of the
observer's perception about that particular opportunity for the
event to occur, and has no reference to hypothetical repetitions of
the opportunity." 166  Thus, in the employment discrimination
context, the subjectivist would report a probability of discrimination
with the caveat that the probability represents a measure of
160 See Tillers, Boston University Law Review Symposium-Introduction, 66 B.U.L. REV.
377, 385 (1986).
161 See id. at 385 n.11.
162 A scale could, for example, be devised through vhich probabilistic evidence
would be rated by the court on a scale of five levels of discrimination (0-19.99%, 20-
39.99%, 40-59.99%, 60-79.99%, 80-100%).
163 See id. at 350.
164 Kaye, supra note 158, at 43.
165 See id. at 42.
166 Aickin, supra note 28, at 350.
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subjective belief. By formulating somewhat modest conclusions, the
subjectivist approach recognizes that statistical analysis will always
be inherently biased. Such an approach might seem to advocate a
more rigorous review of statistical analyses presented in court,
since it recognizes that no finding of discrimination based on
statistical data is truly objective. In fact, subjectivists simply
recognize that different people may be presented with the same
evidence and still come to opposite conclusions.
D. A Bayesian Disparate Impact Framework
1. Applying Bayes' Theorem in Disparate Impact Cases
One statistical model advocated by subjectivists for its ability to
embody the subjective nature of statistical evidence is Bayes'
theorem. Bayes' theorem, a theory of statistical inference, combines
prior and posterior probabilities to determine the likelihood of an
event's occurrence. 167 It has been thought of as a "straightfor-
ward device for assessing the probative value of certain evidence
that might otherwise be difficult to assess," 168 mainly because of
its manipulation of "subjective belief," that is, the prior personal
probabilistic belief of the decision-maker. Because Bayesian analysis
is governed by certain advanced mathematical principles, the
following explanation of Bayes' theorem is accompanied by an
illustrative example that has been constructed to facilitate under-
standing of the model.16 9
The hallmark of Bayes' theorem is that it allows one to process
statistical data by incorporating previous experience into the
statistical analysis. This is undertaken by first determining the prior
distribution, that is, the set of probabilities representing the judge's
prior subjective belief with respect to the problem being analyzed.
The likelihood function, which is the set of probabilities that are
167 See Faigman & Baglioni, Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process, 12 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 1, 2 n.1 (1988); Fienberg-& Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for
the Presentation of Statistical Evidence andforLegalDecisionmaking 66 B.U.L. REV. 771,
771-72 (1986).
168 Faigman & Baglioni, supra note 167, at 2 n.1.
169 For a general discussion of Bayes' theorem and examples of its application in
the courtroom, see G. IVERSEN, BAYEsIAN STATISTICAL INFERENCE 18-33 (1984);
Faigman & Baglioni, supra note :167, at 2 n.1; Fienberg & Schervish, supra note 167,
at 775; Kaye, What is Bayesianism? 'A Guidefor the Perplexed, 28JUIUMETRIcsJ. 161, 170-
73 (1988). The example presented in the text is adapted in part from Iversen's
description of Bayesian analysis.
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derived from the available data, is then determined, The product
of the prior distribution and the likelihood function yields the
posterior distribution, that is, the set of probabilities that incorpo-
rates the judge's subjective knowledge into the probabilities directly
derived from the data.
As an example, assume that a corporation currently employs 200
welders, 60 of whom are black. An analysis undertaken by the
plaintiff indicates, however, that 40% of the welders in the region
are black. The plaintiff's suit against the corporation, based on
both disparate treatment and disparate impact, alleges that its hiring
practices for welders discriminate against blacks. The plaintiff's
figures indicate that the employer's welder hires should be approxi-
mately 40% black to conform to the racial breakdown in the area,
assumed to be that of the qualified applicant pool of welders for the
purposes of this example.
The first step in the Bayesian analysis is to determine the prior
distribution in an employment discrimination context. This is the
prior subjective belief of the judge that there has been hiring
discrimination. This prior distribution is determined before the
likelihood function is known-that is, before the statistical analysis
is presented. In a mixed disparate impact/disparate treatment
claim, the prior distribution is a function of qualitative evidence of
discrimination presented at the trial. 170 Because such evidence
is "soft,"171 the main difficulty in a Bayesian analysis consists of
accurately quantifying such evidence in order to construct the prior
distribution.1 72 The problem of converting subjective belief into
probabilities is compounded by the need for the judge to gauge her
subjective belief of the degree of discrimination for every possible
degree of discrimination. In our example, the judge must assess the
probability that the actual degree of discrimination equals each of
the possible degrees of discrimination between 0% (complete
170 This evidence could, for instance, take the form of testimony of members of
the employer's workforce. Such evidence is often presented in mixed disparate
impact/disparate treatment cases. See e.g., supra note 76. The remainder of the
discussion will assume that the court is presented with a mixed impact/treatment
claim. The problem of modeling a prior distribution in a pure impact claim (with no
qualitative evidence available) is treated infra notes 188-96 and accompanying text.
171 See Tribe, supra note 127, at 1361-62 (defining soft variables as those that are
not readily quantifiable).
172 The difficulties of modelling the prior distribution have been cited as one
problem associated with applying Bayes' theorem in court. See D. BALDUs &J. COLE,
supra note 12, at 304-05; Kaye, supra note 35, at 855; see also G. IVERSEN, supra note
169, at 70-71.
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discrimination-no black hires) and 40% (no discrimination-hiring
that is representative of the qualified applicant pool). Once this is
done, the judge will have determined the prior distribution which
may then be graphed.
1 73
A simplified approach to quantifying the prior distribution is
outlined by Professor Iversen in his paper on Bayesian statistical
inference.1 74 The starting point is the standard formula for the
prior distribution,
f(®) = cea-1(1-0)b1 (1)
where f(®) is the prior distribution, 0 is the unknown degree of
discrimination, C is a constant, and a and b are non-negative
constant integers. 175 To determine the prior distribution, C, a
and b must be quantified. These may be derived from the mean
and variance of the distribution. 176 The mean of the prior distri-
bution represents the expected value of 0. In the above example,
it is assumed to be 20%. That is, the judge believes that the most
likely degree of discrimination is 20% (i.e., the corporation hires
20% black welders). Furthermore, if the judge believes that most of
173 The degree of the employer's discrimination is unknown. To find the "most
likely" degree of discrimination, the likelihood of each of the possible degrees given
the observed data must be determined. Although this procedure may appear to be
complex and time consuming, it may be simplified by constructing "probability
intervals." If thejudge is quite certain that the degree of discrimination lies between
10% and 30%, she may construct a bell shaped curve representing the prior
distribution. Such a procedure may appear to be exceedingly imprecise-it may,
however, be no less so than the actual subjective belief of the judge which will often
be a simple "hunch" as to the degree of discrimination.
174 See G. IVERSEN, supra note 169, at 22-29.
175 This formula is the general expression of the probability density known as the
beta distribution.
176 A property of the beta distribution is that a and b may be derived from the
mean and variance, as
a I [- '" - and b = [1-p] [1i-
where p is the mean and 52 is the variance-which is the square of the standard
deviation-of the distribution. When a and b are integers, the constant C may also
be derived, as
C. = (a + b - 1) 1(a - 1)1 (b - I)I"
G. IVERSEN, supra note 169, at 22-23.
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the probability of the prior distribution lies between 15% and 25%,
then it may be assumed that there is a distance of two standard
deviations from the mean to 15% and 25% so that the standard
deviation is 2.5%.177 Using these figures and the above formu-
las178 to determine a and b yields a = 51 and b = 204. C may then
be derived from a and b.179 This constant is, however, a much
larger figure which is of little use except to graph the curve for
f(O). 18 0 These figures may then be used to derive the prior
distribution, which is
A(9) = C0 50 (1-O) 203.
The second step of this Bayesian analysis is to derive the
likelihood function from the data provided in the example. If there
is a fixed probability 0 that the employer will have a black welder
every time, and if independence between observations is assumed,
the likelihood function will take the form of a binomial distribu-
tion,181 so that
g((/x) = nC,®(1-e),X (2)
where g(®/x) is the likelihood function, nC is the binomial
coefficient, and x is the number of black welders hired in n hires.
In our example, x = 60 and n = 200, so that
177 When the distribution is a bell-shaped "normal" curve, 95% of the probability
lies within two standard deviations of the mean. Thus, the "'2 or 3 standard
deviation' rule... permits one to assess statistical significance in terms of the ratio
of the estimated disparity to its standard error or standard deviation." D. BALDUS &
J. COLE, supra note 12, at 294-95.
178 See supra note 176.
179 See id.
180 See G. IVERSEN, supra note 169, at 25.
181 The binomial model is a
mathematical model that gives the probability that a postelection pool will
contain x minority candidates if (a) the size of the combined postelection
pool is fixed, (b) the minority representation rate in the preselection pool is
known or hypothesized, (c) members of the postelection pool are chosen
through a completely random process, and (d) the preselection pool is much
larger than the postelection pool, exceeding the latter by a factor of ten or
more.
D. BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note 12, at 350.
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g((/x) = 200C60860(1_0)
140 .
The product of this likelihood function and the prior distribution
yields the posterior distribution, that is
f(O/x) = f(0)g(e/x), (3)
where f(O/x) is the posterior distribution. In our example, the
posterior distribution may be derived as
f(O/X) = C"OllO(1-)s43
where C" is a constant.18 2 The new mean and standard deviation
for f(e/p) may then be derived from the function, so that p = 24%
and 6 = 2.0%.183 These figures represent the results of the Baye-
sian analysis, indicating that the mean degree of discrimination after
having taken into consideration prior subjective knowledge and the
likelihood function derived from statistical evidence is 24%. If the
derived posterior distribution is a normal distribution, that is, it is
bell-shaped, 8 4 then a probability estimate may be calculated from
basic statistical analysis, 185 resulting in a finding that there is a .95
probability that the unknown degree of discrimination 0 lies
between 20% and 28%, thus clearly pointing to the guilt of the
defendant.
The effect of the prior distribution-that is, the subjective belief
of the judge-may be seen by comparing the posterior distribution
to the likelihood function derived from the statistical evidence. In
182 The exponent for 0 is derived by adding the exponent for 0 in f(O) and
g(O/x). The same method is used to derive the exponent for (1-0). The constant
C" is equal to the product of the binomial coefficient in g(0/x) and constant in f(a).
Because the posterior distribution is a beta distribution, see supra note 176 and
accompanying text, C" may be derived from a and b to graph the posterior
distribution.
183 When f(O/x) is a beta distribution,
a and 82- -
a+b a+b+ I
Solving for a = 111 and b = 344, one derives p = 24% and 62 = .0004 (adjusted for
rounding). The standard deviation is the square root of the variance so that 6 =
.0201.
184 See supra note 177 (describing the characteristics of a normal curve).
185 Because we are dealing with a normal distribution, there is a .95 probability
that 0 lies ± 1.96 standard deviations from the mean, so that there is a .95 probability
that 20% < 0 < 28%.
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the likelihood function, the estimated degree of discrimination was
30% and the standard deviation was 3.2%. Incorporating the
qualitative evidence has in effect lowered the mean, as such
qualitative evidence seemed to point towards a stronger degree of
discrimination than did the quantitative evidence embodied in the
likelihood function. In short, the Bayesian analysis has allowed the
judge to incorporate all forms of evidence presented at the trial into
a probability distribution illustrating the likelihood of each possible
degree of discrimination. This benefit of Bayes' theorem is one of
the reasons why some scholars advocate using Bayesian models in
the courtroom.
18 6
These results must not, however, overshadow some of the
structural difficulties involved in applying Bayes' theorem to
employment discrimination cases. Indeed, a common criticism of
applying Bayes' theorem in the courtroom is that quantifying the
prior distribution is a difficult task.187 Thus one could argue that
the above quantification of subjective belief was undertaken in an
oversimplified fashion so that the resulting prior distribution is
inaccurate. One response to this criticism is that the subjective
belief of a judge will often remain rather vague, so that merely
approximating the prior distribution-for example, by constructing
a bell shaped curve around the judge's best estimate of the mean
degree of discrimination-is sufficient for the purposes of the
Bayesian analysis. If the judge's prior belief is too vague or
uncertain to engage in such an exercise, then the problem becomes
essentially one of representing ignorance.
186 See, e.g., Faigman & Baglioni, supra note 167, at 16 (concluding that "an
expert's Bayesian formulation will not overwhelm the average trier of fact"); Fienberg
& Schervish, supra note 167, at 795 (suggesting a system of training that would
facilitate the application of Bayes' theorem). But see D. BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note
12, at 304-05 (stating that both the need to construct a prior distribution in a
Bayesian analysis and lack of familiarity of courts with Bayesian theory are such that
it should not be applied in the courtroom); Kaye, supra note 35, at 855 (concluding
that Bayes theorem would not provide much additional guidance to the factfinder);
Kaye, supra note 54, at 779 (asserting that the costs of Bayesian analysis outweigh its
benefits).
187 See, e.g., D. BALDUs & J. COLE, supra note 12, at 304 n.32 (stating that the
problem with applying Bayes' theorem in the courtroom is that "there is nojudicially
acceptable way we know of to quantify an essential variable in the procedure (the
'prior distribution')").
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The problem of modeling ignorance1 8 8 arises in pure dispa-
rate impact cases, in which "soft"18 9 non-statistical evidence of
employment discrimination is unavailable. In such a case, there is
no data from which to specify the prior distribution required in a
Bayesian analysis. The problem is compounded by the fact that
there is no accepted statistical method through which to represent
complete ignorance in a prior distribution. 190 One proposed
solution is to refrain from modelling subjective belief with a prior
distribution and instead to construct a series of prior distributions
and to examine their impact on the data through the posterior
distributions. Such a procedure would allow the judge to gauge the
probative value of the data by examining the effect of the various
prior distributions on the likelihood function derived from the
statistical evidence.
19 1
It may be that there will rarely be a situation in which the
disparate impact judge will be faced with complete ignorance.
Indeed, although cases are generally tried in a vacuum, so that, for
example, the only admissible evidence in a pure disparate impact
case will be statistical in nature, judges are often influenced by other
factors. Statutory construction and stare decisis may both provide
information for the judge to model the prior distribution. If, for
example, the case at hand resembles, by way of statistical evidence,
other cases presented to the judge, she will inevitably be influenced
by her prior decisions.
192
Finally, one may question the value of applying Bayesian theory
in instances in which the! posterior distribution is heavily deter-
mined by the statistical evidence presented in the case.
193
188 The notion of ignorance may be examined from a Bayesian perspective as
distinguishing between "informative and noninformative prior distributions." G.
IVERSEN, supra note 169, at 62.
189 See supra note 171.
190 See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 54, at 779 (asserting that "the use of the uniform
distribution to represent complete ignorance is subject to attack on philosophical
grounds, on mathematical grounds, and on legal grounds" (citations omitted)).
191 See id. Kaye feels, however, that this procedure would not add much to a
presentation of statistical evidence in the form of likelihood functions. See id.;see also
Kaye, The Probability of an Ultimate Issue: The Strange Case ofPaternity Testing 75 IOWA
L. REV. 75,94 n.94 (1989) (conclu ding that "[t]he classic question of how to represent
complete ignorance within the established theory of probability admits of no unique
answer, at least on mathematical grounds").192 This is somewhat similar to "replicating or building on an old study where the
analysis was done using Bayesian inference. In such a case we would simply take the
posterior distribution from the previous study and use it as the prior distribution in
the new study." G. IVERSEN, supra note 169, at 62-63.
19s Generally, if the judge has very little prior information about the degree of
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Applying Bayes' theorem in such pure impact cases poses a
problem, however, only if the posterior distribution indicates by a
slim margin that the defendant is guilty-that is, if the distribution
in the above example indicates that the probability that G lies
between 20% and 28% is only slightly greater than 50%. Critics of
the theory thus argue that to rely largely on statistical evidence that
narrowly points to the guilt of the defendant thwarts the purposes
of the legal process.19 4 One may respond, however, that there is
no reason to believe that naked statistical evidence is inferior to soft
qualitative evidence.1 95 To put it differently, there may be in-
stances in disparate treatment cases in which the defendant is found
guilty, although the evidence only slightly points to a greater than
50% probability of guilt. The problem is that the tenuousness of
statistical evidence is more easily discernible than that of qualitative
evidence. According to the rules of the preponderance of the
evidence test, the plaintiff should prevail as long as the evidence-
regardless of its nature-points to a greater than 50% probability of
guilt. Thus, it may be the assumptions and values underlying such
a test that make certain critics uncomfortable. Practical solutions
may be devised whereby the court would require the plaintiff to
show a probability of guilt of 60% or more to prevail. Legal purists
may claim that such a test would taint the legal process. The
problems of the current system indicate, however, that it is
preferable to recognize the limits of statistical and legal theory by
devising a pragmatic framework that attempts to minimize errors.
Thus, the philosophy behind Bayes' theorem is useful in pure
impact cases, as it focuses on clarifying the relationship between
probability and proof. In a more pedagogical sense, it also
emphasizes the values and assumptions behind the preponderance
of the evidence standard of civil trials by highlighting some of the
perhaps troubling implications of the 50% test. It may be discon-
certing to realize that a defendant has been found guilty because the
probability of her guilt was 50.01%. Yet this concern should not
lead us to discriminate against statistical evidence as opposed to
other forms of evidence, since qualitative soft evidence may be
discrimination, then the posterior distribution will be heavily determined by the data.
Furthermore, the larger the sample size, the less impact the prior distribution will
have on the posterior distribution. See id. at 30.
194 See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text (discussing the paradox of the
gatecrasher).
195 See Brilmayer, Second-Order Evidence and Bayesian Logic, in PROBABILITY AND
INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 151 (P. Tillers & E. Green eds. 1988).
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equally tenuous, and equally inculpatory. It should prompt us to
question whether we have applied the preponderance of the
evidence test consistently, or whether instead we have increased the
standard of proof in those cases for which we are too uncomfortable
to apply the traditional test.
196
2. Bayes' Theorem as a Normative Model
The Bayesian legal model is not without its critics. From a
practical standpoint, some have argued that the trier of fact is too
unsophisticated in the complexity of mathematical techniques to
understand the formula and its significance,197 or that any statisti-
cal evidence may be simply ignored. 198 Indeed, the analysis in
Parts I and II of this Comment indicates the extent to which courts
have misunderstood basic statistical analysis. Thus, skeptics have
argued that since most individuals have little or no experience
juggling probabilities, using Bayesian probabilities in the legal
setting is really counter-intuitive; unaided intuitive probabilistic
judgments are sufficiently accurate for legal purposes. 199 Others
have contested the theoretical foundations of Bayesian probability
analysis, claiming that Bayes' theorem only functions if conditional
independence of evidence is assumed.200 These may be some of
the reasons that relatively few courts are known to have applied
Bayes' theorem to determine relative guilt or innocence.
201
96Seesupra notes 127-29 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of societal
values on legal standards).
197 See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 127, at 1361-65 (arguing that the factfinder may not
be sophisticated enough to give appropriate weight to non-quantitative evidence when
simultaneously faced with the seemingly more exact quantitative analysis provided by
techniques such as Bayes' theorem).
198 See, e.g., Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by
Heuristics, 15 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 1.23, 149 (1981) (suggesting that "[tihe more realistic
problem is presenting statistical evidence so that people will incorporate it into their
decisions at all").
199 See Fienberg & Schervish, supra note 167, at 782.
200 If the evidence is not conditionally independent, it is impossible to update the
odds on guilt versus innocence after each incorporation of statistical evidence, since
introduction of the new evidence would affect the weight of the prior evidence that
was supposed to have already been established, and on which the current odds have
been calculated. See id.
201 See, e.g., D. BALDUS &J. COLE, supra note 12, at 305 n.32 (claiming that they
"know of no court that has applied Bayesian methods to an evidentiary problem").
But see Kaye, supra note 35, at 854 n.69 (1982) (citing law review articles that refer to
cases that have applied Bayesian methods to a legal problem, and also citing Everett
v. Everett, No. D-850-370 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Cal. 1981); Arizona v.
Wagner, No. DR122023 (Super. Ct., Maricopa County, Ariz. 1980)); Kaye, supra note
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Most of these criticisms presuppose that the Bayesian model will
be used in court solely to generate a probability estimate that will
determine whether the burden of persuasion has been met. This
application of the theory is misguided, as it replicates the fallacy of
using a statistical method for the sole purpose of deriving a legally
significant figure. To avoid the problems of relying on statistics that
must always be based on assumptions regarding the source of the
data or the manner in which they have been manipulated, judges
must understand that Bayes' theorem is not a "black box." It must
be used instead as a theoretical framework that will compel the
judge to isolate her subjective belief from any statistical evidence,
thereby preventing the overall picture of the case from being
transformed by an excessive reliance on statistics. Thus, it is more
important that judges accept the philosophical underpinnings of
Bayes' theorem rather than learn how to generate probabilities. If
they understand the basis of Bayesian theory, they will commit fewer
errors of basic misinterpretation when handling statistical evidence.
In this sense, the theory of Bayesian inference may be viewed as
a normative model. As such, it is one that provides a framework for
analyzing the process of proof in employment discrimination
trials. 202 This function may be decried as making the legal pro-
cess of proof a prisoner of a statistical theory, and therefore
distorting the meaning of established judicial principles. At the very
least, however, Bayesian theory may also be used in a more
conservative manner as a "heuristic device" to instruct judges on
how to model normative legal rules. 208 In either case, Bayes'
theorem fleshes out some of the assumptions behind the use of
statistics in the legal process.
3. The Justification for Isolatinig Subjective Belief
To some, the courtroom may appear to be a strikingly inappro-
priate forum in which to apply Bayesian theory. Indeed, the legal
system is ingrained with the notion that judges must not inject their
personal values into the jurisprudential exercise. That function
belongs to legislators, who enact the laws of the nation based on
their personal beliefs and value systems. This principle is particular-
191, at 77 (citing paternity cases as examples of cases applying Bayesian analysis).
202 See Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof 66
B.U.L. RE V. 439,443-48 (1986) (describing the use of Bayes' theorem as a normative
model).
203 See id. at 446-48.
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ly difficult to follow in Title VII cases, where the judge takes on the
role of the jury, as she is the trier of fact.20 4 Still, any misgivings
would be unfounded, as the subjective belief element of Bayes'
theorem does not refer to personal values per se, but to the trier of
fact's instincts with respect to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. Bayes' theorem simply recognizes that the trier of fact
will ultimately make the final decision with respect to the employer's
liability.
The issue is nonetheless an important one, as the deconstructive
formulation of Bayes' theorem uncovers the difficulty of abiding by
the cardinal principle that judges must be objective arbiters of the
law. The psychology of decisionmaking is such that differentjudges
apply different standards when adjudicating cases.20 5 The weight
given to the qualitative anid quantitative evidence in a Title VII
action will vary with the judge who is trying the case. Thus, '[t]he
legal realist may suggest that a jurist simply expresses his personal
vision,"206 so that, for instance, the Court's choice of strict
statistical proof in Wards Cove may have "mirror[ed it]s individual
predilection and ethical regimen."20 7  Arguably, then, isolating
subjective belief merely stands as a statement regarding the relative
frailty of statistics-based judicial decisions.
It may be that the subjective belief of judges adjudicating
disparate impact cases will reflect an inherent reticence to finding
an employer guilty of discrimination, so that the end result for all
disparate impact plaintiffs is the same. One could argue, for
example, that the Wards Cove majority's subjective belief of guilt on
the part of the employer wa-s low even before any statistical evidence
was introduced. The subjectivist would respond that with the
deconstructive Bayesian framework, the Court might not have
ignored "evidence of racial stratification [that] puts the specific
employment practices challenged by [plaintiffs] into perspec-
tive." 208 A second response is that isolating subjective belief may
induce courts to attempt to gain greater understanding of the
legislative mandate of Title VII. Sorting through statistical evidence
and weighing the flaws of mathematical studies is not a simple task.
204 See supra note 24.
205 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
206 Higginbotham, A Brief Reflection on Judicial Use of Social Science Data, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 7, 11.
207 Id. at 10-11.
208 Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2135 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
A COHERENT DISPARATE IMPACT MODEL
It forces the judge to stray from the intuitive subject matter of the
action at hand. Applying Bayes' theorem in the disparate impact
courtroom would guide the judge through a morass of numbers, by
inducing her to respect her prior beliefs, which are inevitably
influenced by the values behind Title VII. The Bayesian principle
of subjective belief reminds the judge that the final ruling must be
premised on the disparate impact directive of Title VII, namely, that
it is unlawful "to limit, segregate, or classify ... employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive.., any
individual of employment opportunities ... because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."209
CONCLUSION
The indisputable need for statistical analysis in employment
discrimination litigation poses a dilemma for lawyers, judges, and
statisticians. The decision to allow the plaintiff to use statistics in
proving a disparate'impact employment discrimination case is in
itself a value-laden one that stems from the equal opportunity
mandate of Title VII. But the adjudication of disparate impact cases
implies a further choice of rules, as it requires developing a set of
statistical guidelines for plaintiffs. That choice of statistical
guidelines "may itself evidence and indeed constitute a change in the
mix of basic values of the society that has made the choice in
question."2 10 The choice of statistical requirements for plaintiffs
is, then, not so much an objective one, as it is a value-laden one.
Over time, that choice has been made by the courts, whose most
recent set of rules has drastically altered the value system that had
originally encouraged plaintiffs to use statistics in disparate impact
cases. As this Comment has shown, many statistical rules are
applied to the benefit of the employer, and their egregious effect on
the plaintiff often remains cloaked under the misleading guise of
objective reasoning. Applying a Bayesian analysis will ensure both
that judges better understand the basic statistical principles with
which they must work in disparate impact cases, and that "objective"
statistical reasoning will neither cloud nor distort the actual
assumptions and values behind the judge's decision.
209 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1988).
210 Tribe, supra note 127, at 1392.
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